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This thesis applies the theories and approaches of industrial organization to study three 
key issues pertaining to information goods industry.  
The first study investigates the incentives of a monopolistic vendor to delay the 
introduction of a new and improved version of its product in a stationary market with 
identical consumers. It shows that the vendor’s monopoly power is constrained by the 
mutual cannibalization between the successive generations of products. By deferring 
sale of the new product, the vendor may charge consumers higher prices for both the 
old and new products. I characterize the equilibria with delayed introduction, and study 
their changes with respect to market and product parameters.  In particular, I suggest 
that delayed introduction could occur regardless of whether the seller can offer 
upgrade discounts to consumers, that instead, it is related to quality improvement 
brought about by the new product, durabilities, and discount factors. 
The second study is about a vendor’s strategies to tackle its own installed base 
when selling a newly improved product. In particular, I investigate the optimal 
combinations of timing, pricing and product line strategies that the vendor can employ 
for selling its newly improved product in the presence of an installed base. I 
characterize the market with either a partly- or fully- covered installed base in terms of 
consumers’ relative willingness to pay for the newly improved version and their 
relative payoffs from delayed purchase across periods. Different from the conventional 
proposition of constant consumer reservation price, I propose that if consumers already 
own an existing (old) version of a durable product, their willingness to purchase the 
newly improved version indeed increases over time! This effect, interweaving with 
consumer heterogeneity on valuation of quality and on purchase history may enable 
perfect intertemporal price discrimination.  
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Extending the prior research on upgrade pricing to a more general setting, I 
find that upgrade pricing is not able to segment consumers with different purchase 
history when consumer heterogeneity is sufficiently high. In that case, instead of 
upgrade pricing, the vendor would maximize its profit via intertemporal price 
discrimination, or delayed introduction, or pooling pricing, depending on the 
characteristics of market structure and technology improvement.  
Overcoming the intractability of addressing delayed product introduction in a 
market with heterogeneous consumers, this study analytically confirms Fishman and 
Rob’s speculation (2000) that the heterogeneity in consumers’ valuation of quality may 
discourage vendor’s incentive to launch a new product. I find that two forces may 
induce the vendor to delay selling the newly improved product: one is the 
cannibalization of the stock of durable goods in consumers’ hand (Hui and Wang 
2005); the other is the consumers’ anticipation of future price reductions. Particularly, 
the latter can lead to delayed introduction even when the extent of quality 
improvement embodied in the new product is high. 
The third study is about information security, in particular, the strategic 
interactions among end-users and between users and hackers. It shows that security 
efforts by end users are strategic substitutes.  This explains the inertia among end-users 
in taking precautions even in the face of grave potential consequences. Next, by 
encompassing both direct and indirect effects, this study suggest that reducing user 
cost of precautions or increasing enforcement against hackers need not enhance overall 
information security because of the feedback effect through the actions of the other 
side of the market. Third, the welfare analysis suggests that policy should focus on 
facilitating user precautions if the users’ benefit relative to the cost of precaution and 
the hackers’ expected enjoyment relative to targeting cost are sufficiently high.  Finally, 
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we argue for appropriate international authority to make and coordinate policy across 
borders to resolve international externalities. 
These three studies demonstrate that the theories and models developed in 
traditional industrial organization are effective approaches to study the market-related 
issues that are enabled by or specific to information goods industry. Further, studying 
the intriguing relationships between information technology and market structure 
expands the prior theories and models of industrial organization and opens up avenues 
of future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Background 
Industrial organization is the branch of economics that studies the structure of firms 
and markets and of their interactions (Carlton and Perloff 2005, Pepall, Richards and 
Norman 2005). This thesis applies the theories and approaches of industrial 
organization to study three key issues pertaining to the information goods industry. 
One is about the incentive of a monopolistic vendor to delay the introduction of a new 
and improved version of its product. The second is about a vendor’s strategies to tackle 
its own installed base when selling a newly improved product. The third is about 
information security, in particular, the strategic interactions among end-users and 
between users and hackers.  
Industrial organization addresses the imperfect competition using the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm as descriptive approach and applying game theory in 
the analysis of strategic interaction (Carlton, et. al 2005, Pepall et. al 2005). The nature 
of technology and demand for a product as the basic condition shapes the market 
structure which in turn influences the conduct of market participants and determines an 
industry’s performance.  
An information goods industry is distinct from traditional industries in several 
aspects. First, production of information goods typically involves high fixed costs and 
low marginal costs. This is true not just for pure information goods which are 
immaterial, but even for physical goods such as silicon chips. The specific cost 
structure leads to significant market power and then monopolistic competition in most 
information goods markets (Varian 2004). Second, information goods either are made 
up of “bits” or work in the digital form. The lack of physical constraint facilitates rapid 
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pace of innovation in information goods industry. A new improved successor may 
render the existing product technologically obsolete well before it is functionally 
obsolete (Fishman and Rob 2000, Varian 2004). Third, an information goods industry 
is featured with high interdependency. On the supply side, many functions may be 
implemented through the connection and cooperation with its complementary products. 
On the demand side, the benefits that consumers derive from the product may depend 
on the size of the existing user base. Fourth, information technology provides the 
convenience for information access and communication. This enables various lucrative 
business models and improves social efficiency; however, the widespread use of 
Internet also poses serious threats to security (Whitman 2003). 
The above differences determine the unique structure-conduct-performance 
matrix in an information-goods market.  Application of game theory to information 
goods markets can capture the essential features of the interaction among the market 
participants, and make clear the underlying structure and the principles governing the 
market outcome (Carlton, et. al 2005, Pepall et. al 2005). Focusing on different issues, 
the three essays in this thesis follow this approach and extend the research of industrial 
organization to information goods industry.  
1.2 Delayed Product Introduction 
The first essay applies a stylized economic model to investigate the incentives of an 
information-goods vendor to delay the introduction of a new and improved version of 
its product.  
Facing the rapid pace of information technology (IT) development, IT 
manufacturers often seem to hesitate in launching new and better products with 
cutting-edge technologies. We have witnessed the introduction of wideband third-
generation (3G) mobile phone services long after the technologies for 3G cellular 
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networks and mobile phones became available several years ago. Similar observations 
can be found in the markets of DVD video recorders, stereo systems integrating MP3 
decoder or home electronic products that adopt MPEG-4 standard, where the vendors 
seem reluctant to launch new products that incorporate better technologies. Given 
these intriguing observations, it is interesting to understand the strategic decisions of a 
vendor who currently sells an existing product, and who can choose whether to sell a 
new product with better technologies.  Specifically, we address the following research 
questions: Suppose a new technology that improves the quality of an existing product 
is invented, and applying it to a new product does not involve prohibitively high costs.  
Would a vendor have incentives to deliberately delay selling the new product?  If so, 
under what circumstances would the vendor adopt such a strategy? 
The research about delayed product introduction is closely related to three 
streams of work in the literature. One of them studies product timing; another focuses 
on market segmentation and price discrimination; the third examines the monopolist’s 
incentive to plan for product obsolescence. However, the prior research has not 
formally incorporated the strategic interactions between vendor and consumers when 
addressing the economic considerations of delayed product introduction. This could be 
partially due to the intrinsic limitation of the two-period model, which has been widely 
employed in strategic analysis of new product introduction (Dhebar, 1994, Waldman 
1996b, Lee and Lee 1998, Kornish, 2001). As an effective approach to answer the 
“yes/no” question about the launching of the newly improved product, the 
conventional two-period model is unable to explicitly address the important issue of 
whether to launch it now or later. In addition, most of the existing studies focus on 
traditional industrial products, and hence their models cannot capture an important 
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characteristic pertaining to IT-intensive products: they are physically durable; but 
technologically have much shorter lifespan (Dhebar 1996).  
In Chapter 2, we use a three-period model which closely follows the spirit of 
the classical durable goods monopolist literature to answer the above research 
questions.  It shows that the vendor may prefer to delay introducing a new product, 
even though the enabling technologies for the product are already available.  The 
underlying motivation is analogous to that found in the durable goods monopolist 
literature – the vendor suffers from a time inconsistency problem that causes its old 
and new products to cannibalize each other.  Without the ability to remove existing 
stock of the old product from the market, shorten product durability, or pace research 
and development (R&D), it may respond by selling the new product later.  This study 
characterizes the equilibria with delayed introduction, and studies their changes with 
respect to market and product parameters.  In particular, it suggests that delayed 
introduction could occur regardless of whether the vendor can offer upgrade discounts 
to consumers, that instead, it is related to quality improvement brought about by the 
new product, durabilities, and discount factors.   
1.3 Technology Timing and Pricing in the Presence of an Installed 
Base 
The second essay investigates an IT vendor’s strategies to tackle its own installed base 
when selling a newly improved product. By simplifying the three-period model into a 
two-period game, this study extends the first essay to a market with consumers 
differing in valuation of product quality and purchase history. Other than delayed 
product introduction, this essay is motivated by the sluggish demand caused by the 
installed base -- a more general concern in the information goods industry. It considers 
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a much broader set of timing and pricing strategies that the vendor can employ in 
selling the newly improved product in the presence of an installed base of the old 
product. Delayed product introduction, together with intertemporal price 
discrimination, pooling pricing and premium pricing, becomes one of the outcomes of 
the strategic interaction between vendor and consumers under the impact of 
technological obsolescence and existing installed base. 
Firms in the information technology (IT) industry face a paradox of rapid 
technological progress: To sustain ongoing industry leadership, a firm should strive to 
develop the next best technology (Mohr, Sengupta and Slater 2005). However, on one 
hand, the firm’s newly improved technology renders obsolete its older technology, 
further contributing to competitive volatility. On the other hand, the installed base of 
its own products adopting the older technology turns to be a formidable competitor to 
the new technology, particularly when technological progress outpaces users’ capacity 
of fully utilizing technology (Varian 2004). In the personal computer (PC) and 
mainframe industry, a major concern for vendors is to tackle the reluctance of 
individual or business users to replace old PCs or mainframes by newer ones 
(McDonald 2006). Even for computer software, with more than 90% of PCs running 
some sort of Windows, Microsoft has long considered its main competitor to be the 
installed base of its own products (Berlind 2005).  
Aware of the baulking consumers caused by the rapid technology improvement 
(Dhebar 1996), prior research in new product introduction suggests that to attract 
consumers to upgrade, vendor has the incentive to reduce product durability (Bulow 
1986, Waldman 1996b). If the vendor is unable to artificially shorten the durability of 
its products, offering upgrade price discounts to existing consumers may raise its profit 
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and at the same time attain socially optimal outcomes (Waldman 1997, Fishman and 
Rob 2000).  
Compared to the analysis of shortening durability or its variations, studies on 
timing and pricing strategies to cope with installed base are lacking. Most of the 
existing research on product line introduction employs a two-period framework, which 
assumes fixed introduction timing for the new product (launching in the second period 
or not launching) (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole 1998). This restricted setting constrains 
the vendor’s wisdom in selling the new product facing a certain installed base of its 
older product: it can induce consumers’ self-selection of whether or not to purchase the 
new product in the second period, but not when to purchase it. This is especially 
unrealistic considering the fact that vendors often use timing to segment the market. 
Recurrent model or continuous-time models have also been applied in studying 
technology innovation and product introduction. However, to make the models 
tractable, the researchers either assume consumers are homogeneous in valuation of 
product quality (Fishman and Rob 2000), or just study a single product introduction 
(Stokey 1979).  
Generally, the theoretical limitations of prior research lie in the followings.  
• First, previous studies mostly focus on static analysis of the demand in a market 
consisting of consumers differing in valuation of product quality and purchase history.  
Little research has addressed the same issue in consideration of the time dimension. 
The complexity of the demand side lies not only in the heterogeneity among 
consumers, but also the market as a carrier of history and the future. It is unclear how 
existing consumers’ intention to upgrade changes over time, and how the time trend of 
intention to upgrade differs among consumer segments.  
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• Second, given the differing demand for upgrade, upgrade pricing has never been 
studied along the time dimension. In particular, how should vendors respond to the 
demand variation by leveraging intertemporal or intra-temporal price discrimination?  
• Third, it has long been considered that with upgrade pricing, vendors will adopt 
socially efficient strategies (Waldman 1997, Lee and Lee 1998, Fishman and Rob 
2000). In this study, with a more general setting that encompasses consumer’s 
heterogeneity in valuation of product quality (cf. the high heterogeneity setting in Lee 
and Lee (1998), or the homogeneous setting in Fishman and Rob (2000)), are there 
situations where upgrade pricing loses its power to segment the market? If so, can 
vendors sustain their monopoly power using time as a discrimination instrument? 
In Chapter 3, we address the above research questions, and study alternative 
pricing and product line strategies such as intertemporal price discrimination, delayed 
product introduction, and upgrade pricing instead of changing durability to alleviate 
the cannibalization from the installed base, which has often been advocated in the 
literature. Specifically, we investigate the optimal combinations of timing, pricing and 
product line strategies that the vendor can employ for selling its newly improved 
product in the presence of an installed base. We characterize the market with either a 
partly- or fully- covered installed base in terms of consumers’ relative willingness to 
pay for the newly improved version and their relative payoffs from delayed purchase 
across periods. Different from the conventional proposition of constant consumer 
reservation price, we propose that if consumers have already owned an existing (old) 
version of a durable product, their willingness to purchase the newly improved version 
indeed increases over time. This effect, interweaving with consumer heterogeneity on 
valuation of quality and purchase history, may enable perfect intertemporal price 
discrimination.  
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Extending the prior research on upgrade pricing to a more general setting, we 
find that upgrade pricing is not able to segment consumers with different purchase 
history when consumer heterogeneity is sufficiently high. In that case, instead of 
upgrade pricing, the vendor would maximize its profit through intertemporal price 
discrimination, delayed introduction, or pooling pricing, depending on the 
characteristics of market structure and degree of technology improvement.  
Overcoming the intractability of addressing delayed product introduction in a 
market with heterogeneous consumers, this study analytically confirms Fishman and 
Rob’s speculation (2000) that the heterogeneity in consumers’ valuation of quality may 
discourage vendor’s incentive of launching a new product. We find that two forces 
may induce the vendor to delay selling the newly improved product: one is the 
cannibalization of the stock of durable goods in consumers’ hand (Hui and Wang 
2005); the other is the consumers’ anticipation of future price reductions. Particularly, 
the latter can lead to delayed introduction even when the extent of quality 
improvement embodied in the new product is high. 
Without the concern about cost, social welfare directly depends on whether the 
vendor can sustain its monopoly power facing the mutual cannibalization between the 
old and new products, and the mutual arbitrage between the heterogeneous consumers1. 
1.4 Information Security: User Precautions and Hacker Targeting 
The third essay analyzes the strategic interactions among end-users and between users 
and hackers.  Information security is a critical issue of both national policy and 
1 Suppose there are two groups of consumers in a market, one group has higher valuation on product 
quality than the other. The mutual arbitrage between heterogeneous consumers refer to the situations in 
which either group of consumers have the incentive to accept the price and purchase timing that are 
originally assigned by firm for the other group. 
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business operations (Whitman 2003).  For instance, in May 2004, Sven Jaschan created 
the Sasser worm to exploit a vulnerability in the Windows 2000 and XP operating 
systems.  The Sasser worm and its variants caused hundreds of thousands of PCs to 
crash (ZDnet 2005).  In August 2003, the Microsoft Blaster worm exploited a 
vulnerability in Windows 2000 and XP to infect hundreds of thousands of computers, 
from which it launched a “denial of service” attack on the Microsoft Windows Update 
server (Register 2003).  During the summer of 2001, the “Code Red” worm and its 
successor “Code Red II” exploited a vulnerability in the Microsoft Internet Information 
Server to cause over $2 billion in damage (Moore et al. 2002).  The threat of attack and 
intrusion now extends to mobile phones (Symantec 2005).  
Information security depends on user efforts – to fix vulnerabilities, install and 
update software to detect neutralize viruses and other malicious software, install and 
configure firewalls, take care with file-sharing programs and email attachments, etc.  
Security is a critical issue only because of the activities of (unethical) hackers. Industry 
has systematically tracked hacker behavior: “Attackers continuously look for easy 
targets, those that will provide them with the maximum return on the time they invest 
in writing malicious code” (Symantec 2005, page 55).  Clearly, hacker activity 
depends on user behavior.  
While there has been some research into the incentives of end-users 
(Kunreuther and Heal 2003; August and Tunca 2005), and the motivations of hackers 
(eg, Jordan and Taylor 1998; Van Beveren 2000), there has been little scholarly 
attention to the strategic interaction between end-users and hackers. 
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, we analyze the strategic interactions among end-
users and between end-users and hackers.  We address several questions in particular.  
First, it is well known that information security poses grave potential consequences.  
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Yet, end-users seem quite slow to take precautions (Boss 2005) – to the point that they 
must be exhorted and goaded by government and vendors (US-CERT 2006).   What 
explains this inertia? 
Second, given the strategic interactions, how does information security vary 
with changes in the user cost of precaution and the rate of enforcement against hackers?   
This question is not trivial.  For instance, a reduction in the user cost of precaution 
would directly lead users to increase precautions.  However, that would make them 
less attractive targets, and so induce hackers to reduce their targeting, and hence, 
indirectly lead users to reduce precautions.  Accordingly, the net effect depends on the 
balance between direct and indirect effects. 
Third, information security can be and is addressed from two angles – 
facilitating end-user precautions, and enforcement against hackers.  Both policies are 
costly.  Owing to the strategic interaction, facilitation of user precautions will affect 
hacker behavior, and enforcement against hackers will affect user behavior.  From the 
standpoint of social welfare, what is the right balance between the two classes of 
policy? 
Fourth, viruses and worms do not respect international borders.  The Sasser 
worm illustrated the asymmetric distribution of hackers vis-à-vis users across countries.   
How should governments address information security when threats cross borders? 
This study shows that security efforts by end users are strategic substitutes.  
This explains the inertia among end-users in taking precautions even in the face of 
grave potential consequences. Next, we analyze the direct and indirect effects of 
changes in the user cost of precaution and the rate of enforcement against hackers.  For 
instance, a reduction in the user cost of precaution would directly lead users to increase 
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precautions.  However, that would make them less attractive targets, and so induce 
hackers to reduce their targeting, and hence, indirectly lead users to reduce fixing.  
Next, we study welfare implications.  We show that policy should focus on facilitating 
user precautions if the users’ benefit relative to the cost of precaution and the hackers’ 
expected enjoyment relative to targeting cost are sufficiently high.  Finally, we argue 
for appropriate international authority to make and coordinate policy across borders to 
resolve international externalities. 
1.5 Contribution 
1.5.1 Potential Contribution of Delayed Product Introduction 
The study about delayed product introduction can provide useful insights for managers 
of technological products. Popular examples of such products include personal 
computers, audio-visual equipment, communication tools, and specialized software 
(e.g., econometrics or statistics software). Vendors of these products often cannot 
control the schedule of new technologies’ arrivals and the obsolescence of old products.  
Hence, for them, product innovation and introduction are two separate decisions – they 
might not be able to endogenize the extent of product innovation, but they could 
always control whether and when to sell new products. Because of this separation of 
sale from innovation, it is interesting to study whether it is socially optimal for a 
vendor to defer introducing a new product ⎯ an insight that cannot be obtained in 
prior studies of product introduction (Fishman and Rob 2000; Lee and Lee 1998; 
Waldman 1996a). This study can also explain why vendors do not deploy new and 
superior technologies to create new products in some markets.  The inclusion of 
durability as a model parameter allows us to extend our insights directly to products 
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that exhibit different life spans (perhaps due to high dependencies on external parts, 
technologies, or trends).   
This study can contribute to the literature of technology adoption by analyzing 
both the vendor’s and consumers’ economic incentives of adopting a new and better 
technology. Venkatesh and Brown (2001) suggest that rapid technology improvement 
and the fear for obsolescence have been the major concerns that dissuade consumers 
from purchasing a product. Based on their insights, this study moves the literature 
forward by measuring obsolescence through the quality improvement embodied in the 
new product and the duration over which the product can provide usable services. This 
setting can capture the nature of the information goods industry where obsolescence 
does not just result from being superseded by technologically superior successors 
within the product; it could also happen because of shrinking operational lifespan due 
to continuously updated external environments, such as peripheral components, 
communications standards, or hardware and software architectures. By extending the 
theories developed in the durable-goods monopoly literature 2, we show that delayed 
product introduction can be a strategic solution for vendors facing consumers who are 
disconcerted by the fast-paced IT industry3. 
1.5.2 Potential Contribution of Technology Timing and Pricing in the 
Presence of an Installed Base 
This study can provide both theoretical and practical contributes to the literature of 
new product introduction.  
2  For an excellent summary of this literature, see Waldman (2003). 
3 As stated by Dhebar (1996, p37), “The rapid introduction of new and improved versions can make a 
consumer regret a previous purchase, hesitate over any new purchase, and agonize over similar purchase 
in the future.” 
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• First, it relaxes the conventional assumption that all consumers possess nothing at 
the beginning of the game (Kornish 2001) and generalizes consumer’s utility function 
by simultaneously incorporating the time dimension, valuation of product quality, and 
purchase history into the utility function. Hence, it can characterize consumers’ 
purchase patterns over time by considering various scenarios pertaining to consumers’ 
possession of a low-quality product as an initial condition. 
• Second, it overcomes the limitation of two-period models and enables the study of 
flexible product introduction schemes as the combinations of possible timing, pricing, 
and product line strategies. Other than upgrade pricing, the vendor can choose 
intertemporal price discrimination, pooling pricing or premium pricing combining with 
immediate or delayed introduction timing to alleviate the cannibalization due to its 
own installed base. 
• Based on the above approaches, the study of the strategic interaction between 
vendor and consumers can provide insights on the optimal product introduction 
scheme for vendor to cope with the existing installed base. This will provide useful 
guidelines for managers who often have to consider the installed base of their existing 
products when selling new products. Instead of transforming their business models to 
control for product durability (as suggested by Bulow 1986, Waldman 1996b), they 
may adopt flexible timing and pricing strategies. Failing to select the right product line 
and pricing strategies, they may gravely suffer from the combined dampening effects 
of the stock of durable goods in consumers’ hand, and consumers’ anticipation of 
future price reductions. By contrast, via proper timing, pricing, and product line 
strategies, the vendor may even be able to practice perfect price discrimination by 
utilizing the existing consumers’ increasing need to upgrade to the new product. 
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1.5.3 Potential Contribution of Information Security: User Precautions 
and Hacker Targeting 
This study develops a fairly general model of the strategic interaction among end-users 
in taking security precautions and also the interaction between users and hackers.  In a 
setting with a continuum of user types, this study shows how users’ choice of purchase 
and their effort in fixing depend on hackers’ targeting and vice versa. The analysis of 
the direct and indirect effects of changes in the user cost of precaution and the rate of 
enforcement against hackers can provide empirical implications as well as 
recommendations for public policy.  While a setting of information security is 
considered, the analysis can generally apply to any situation in which potential victims 
take precautions against attack by others.4
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CHAPTER 2 DELAYED PRODUCT INTRODUCTION 
2.1 Introduction 
Technologies for wideband third-generation (3G) cellular networks and mobile phones 
have been available for several years, yet many telecommunications companies are 
still reluctant to provide 3G mobile phone services.  The use of DVD media for 
recording, storing and retrieving voluminous data has been popular since the beginning 
of this century, but it was only recently that we started to see DVD video recorders 
being actively promoted by hardware vendors.  The MP3 compression format for 
digital music has been well developed since the late 1990s, but it took several more 
years before we saw vendors of stereo systems include in their products MP3 decoders 
that read and playback MP3 files on CDs.  Similarly, we have yet to see widespread 
use of the MPEG-4 standard in home electronic products, even though it became an 
international standard in the year 2000.  Why do hardware vendors seem to hesitate in 
launching new and better products with cutting-edge technologies? 
The examples above share a number of characteristics.  First, the research and 
development (R&D) of the new technologies were often pioneered by independent 
researchers or companies, not by the hardware vendors who apply the technologies to 
their products.  Therefore, the hardware vendors may not control when the new 
technologies become available.  Second, many hardware vendors who consider using 
the new technologies sell products that incorporate previous generations of similar 
technologies.  For example, most telecommunications companies currently provide 
mobile phone services on second-generation cellular networks and handsets; many 
vendors of DVD video recorders are also major vendors of conventional videotape 
recorders.  Third, the markets for products that incorporate these new technologies, or 
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earlier generations of similar technologies, tend to be concentrated – they are often 
dominated by a small number of large vendors.  Fourth, products that use these (new or 
earlier-generation) technologies are mostly durable.  They supply long streams of 
services to consumers, and the quality of services does not significantly drop over 
time.  Hence, consumers often take into account the durability of such products when 
making purchase decisions.  Finally, the functional values of products that use earlier-
generation technologies are not affected by the presence of products with the new 
technologies.  If consumers do not appreciate the new technologies, they can ignore the 
new products and continue using the products they have previously purchased.  
Given these common characteristics and the intriguing observation that some 
vendors seem reluctant to launch new products that incorporate better technologies, it 
is interesting to understand the strategic decisions of a vendor who currently sells an 
existing product, and who can choose whether to sell a new product with better 
technologies.  Specifically, we address the following research questions: Suppose a 
new technology that improves the quality of an existing product is invented, and 
applying it to a new product does not involve prohibitively high costs.  Would a 
vendor have incentives to deliberately delay selling the new product?  If so, under what 
circumstances would the vendor adopt such a strategy? 
We use a stylized economic model which closely follows the spirit of the classical 
durable goods monopolist literature5 to answer the above research questions.  Our 
model consists of three periods, and each period comprises two stages.  In the first 
stage of each period, a monopolistic vendor makes product and pricing decisions.  In 
5  Representative works in this literature include Bulow (1982, 1986), Dhebar (1994), Fishman and Rob 
(2000), Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), Kornish (2001), Lee and Lee (1998), Levinthal and Purohit (1989), 
Purohit (1994), Stokey (1981), and Waldman (1993, 1996a, 1996b).  For an excellent summary, see 
Waldman (2003). 
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the second stage, consumers observe the offers made by the vendor and decide whether 
to buy the product.  The vendor can only sell a low-quality product in the first period.  
In the second period, owing to external R&D, a new technology arrives that enables 
him to produce and sell a high-quality product.  The vendor has to choose among three 
courses of action: (a) sell the high-quality product immediately in the second period; 
(b) sell the high-quality product in the third period; or (c) do not sell the high-quality 
product in either period.  Option (b) corresponds to delayed introduction – the vendor 
purposely chooses not to sell a better product in an earlier period, even though the 
product is available and it could feasibly sell it to consumers.  We further allow the 
low- and high-quality products to exhibit various degrees of durability.  This facilitates 
generalizations of our findings to different technological products.  The chosen market 
structure and model features resemble the characteristics of the examples that we have 
raised (3G mobile phone services, DVD video recorders, etc.).   
In our model, we find that under a wide range of conditions, the vendor has 
incentives not to sell the new (high-quality) product immediately.  This is because the 
existing stock of the old (low-quality) product that has been sold to consumers limits 
its ability to charge a high price for the new product (i.e., the old product cannibalizes 
the new product).  Further, the expectation that there is going to be a new product in 
the future may dampen the incentives of consumers to buy the old product.  Unless the 
price of the old product is low, consumers may prefer to wait and buy the new product 
that promises better quality (i.e., the prospect of a new product in the future 
cannibalizes the old product).  It is these intertemporal cannibalizations between the 
old and new products that lead the vendor to delay selling the new product. 
Specifically, by deferring sale of the new product, the vendor extends the 
economic life span of the old product, which increases its value to consumers.  It also 
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allows the old product to be used for one more period, and hence the old product 
depreciates more in value; consumers who have bought it in an earlier period would 
then be willing to pay more to upgrade to the new product in a later period.  This 
allows the vendor to charge a higher price for the new product and earn more profit.6  
To provide useful strategic insights, we analyze our model in two separate 
scenarios.  In the first scenario, the vendor cannot implement an upgrade policy.  
Hence, all consumers must pay the same price to acquire the new product.  In the 
second scenario, the vendor can implement an upgrade policy that allows consumers to 
trade in the old product for the new product at a discounted price.  Compared with 
other consumers, those who own the old product pay less to enjoy the new product (in 
other words, the vendor can practice price discrimination based on the purchase history 
of consumers).  We find that the vendor chooses different product and pricing 
strategies in these two scenarios.  Generally, it prefers the upgrade policy because it 
allows him to convince all consumers to purchase the old product as soon as possible.  
The provision of an upgrade option also leads to socially efficient outcomes.  
Regardless of whether an upgrade policy is provided, however, delayed selling 
of the new product is always optimal for the vendor with some combinations of 
product and consumer characteristics.  Therefore, the provision of an upgrade policy 
may not be the key determinant in the introduction timing of next-generation 
technological products (cf. Fishman and Rob 2000).  Instead, we find that the vendor’s 
choice of whether to delay selling the new product is related to product durabilities, 
6  In practice, when deciding whether to upgrade a technological product (e.g., personal computer), 
consumers often need to assess the remaining service values of their existing products.  If the existing 
products are expected to have short life spans, consumers may be willing to pay more to upgrade to new 
products. 
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extent of quality improvement, and the discount factors.  These results are robust to 
changes in the vendor’s ability to credibly commit to product strategies. 
Our study provides useful insights for managers of technological products, especially 
those that depend heavily on components developed by external vendors.  Popular 
examples of such products include personal computer, audio-visual equipment, 
communication tools, and specialized software (e.g., econometrics or statistics 
software).  For vendors of these products, delaying the sales of new products that use 
better technologies may sometimes be beneficial because of the alleviation of 
intertemporal cannibalizations.  Further, if a vendor is hesitant about when to sell a 
new product, our model suggests that it should evaluate the durabilities of its products 
and the improvement in quality that the new product will bring to consumers.  
Knowledge of whether consumers are patient is also useful in this context. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 reviews previous 
research that is related to delayed introduction of new products.  Section 2.3 presents 
our research model.  Section 2.4 outlines the analysis and characterizes all equilibria in 
the studied markets.  Section 2.5 relaxes a few assumptions of the model.  Section 2.6 
considers the case with no commitment.  Section 2.7 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Prior Literature 
The literature on technology diffusion, adoption and strategic management has 
suggested that fear of obsolescence may cause consumers to hesitate or refuse to buy 
current technological products (Cohen et al. 1996; Dhebar 1996; Venkatesh and Brown 
2001).  The concern of consumers about product obsolescence is particularly 
noteworthy in high technology markets because the usability of such products is often 
governed by external technological progress, standards or architectures (Morris and 
Ferguson 1993; West and Jason 2000).  Evidently, hardware products suffer from wear 
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and tear, and sometimes, changes in communications standards with peripheral 
technologies.7  Even software products that are supposedly perfectly durable could at 
times be superseded because of updates in processor instruction sets or operating 
systems.  Therefore, to avoid getting products that could soon be obsolete, consumers 
may wait for new products and defer making purchases – this is often called 
leapfrogging in the literature. 
In response to the threat of leapfrogging by consumers, firms that sell multiple 
generations of similar products may wish to slow down the pace of new product 
introduction.  This could serve two purposes.  First, delayed introduction may help 
dissuade consumers from waiting for new products and accumulate potential buyers 
for future products (Putsis 1993).  Second, it may lessen the regret of consumers who 
have bought old-generation products and persuade them to switch to new products in 
the future (Dhebar 1996). 
Various theoretical studies have responded to the above observations and 
modeled the timing decisions of firms that sell multiple generations of similar 
products.  Specifically, by studying the decisions of a monopolist in a two-period 
framework, Dhebar (1994) and Kornish (2001) conclude that a vendor may defer 
selling new products because if product introduction occurs too frequently, it is 
difficult to make all products appear attractive to consumers.  They have not, however, 
formally characterized any equilibrium that involves delayed introduction of new 
products.  Chatterjee and Sugita (1990) and Radas and Shugan (1998) show that 
delayed introduction is optimal when demand is uncertain, or when demand is seasonal 
7  For example, the growing popularity of the universal serial bus (USB) interface has rendered many 
computer peripherals that use old communication interfaces, such as parallel or serial ports, obsolete.  
Similarly, rapid changes in processor and mother board architectures have made old-generation random 
access memory (RAM) chips incompatible with new PCs.  
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and expanding.  Their results stem from specific assumptions on demand structures 
and firms’ knowledge.  By contrast, we show that even if demand is constant and a 
vendor has perfect knowledge about consumers, delay is still an optimal strategy in 
many circumstances.   
Our study is perhaps closest to that of Fishman and Rob’s (2000), which 
illustrates that in a continuous-time framework with homogeneous consumers, no 
upgrade policies, and perfectly durable products, a monopolist’s rate of product 
innovation would be too low, which could cause inefficient delays in new product 
introductions.  They show that with an upgrade policy, however, the vendor would not 
delay new product introductions,8 which is different from what we report in this study.  
Our setting differs from that of Fishman and Rob’s in three aspects.  First, in their 
setting, product innovation involves R&D costs, and new products are launched as 
soon as they become available.  Hence, their concept of delay is that of innovation, not 
of introduction per se.  In our case, product innovation is exogenous and fixed; we 
focus on the vendor’s strategic choice of when to sell a new product that has just 
become available – a decision that follows product innovation and does not involve 
R&D costs.  Second, they consider only perfectly durable products.  By contrast, we 
include durability as a model parameter, and that allows us to extend our insights to 
different technological products, especially those that work closely with base products 
(as in computer software and hardware) or peripheral components (see footnote 3 and 
the related discussion above).  Third, they do not explicitly demonstrate that the vendor 
would prefer a strategy with delayed product introduction.  By contrast, we illustrate 
through comprehensive evaluations of possible strategies that under a wide range of 
8  Lee and Lee (1998) derive similar conclusions in a two-period model with two groups of consumers. 
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conditions, the vendor would prefer delayed introduction owing to revenue but not cost 
considerations. 
2.3. Basic Setting 
Consider a monopolistic vendor who is planning to sell two versions of a product over 
three periods, t = 1, 2 or 3.  In period 1, it can only sell a low-quality product, L, with 
quality qL.  Owing to R&D, a new technology arrives in period 2, which allows him to 
sell a new product, H, with quality qH > qL, in either period 2 or 3.  For ease of 
presentation, we normalize qH to one, and hence 0 < qL < qH = 1.  Both the old (low-
quality) and new (high-quality) products are of the same durability n ≥ 2 periods.  We 
shall relax this assumption and allow for different durabilities later in Section 2.5.  We 
further assume zero fixed and marginal costs to focus on the strategic choices of the 
vendor in response to market demand.9
On the demand side, consumers are homogeneous, and we normalize their size 
and valuation of quality to one.  Each consumer demands at most one unit of each 
version of the product.  Within its life span, the product provides a constant stream of 
service to consumers; once consumers buy it, they enjoy a value that equals its quality 
in each period of service until it is retired (either because it is replaced by a newer 
product or because it has exceeded its physical life span).  There is no second-hand 
market; hence, as soon as consumers buy a new product, their old products are retired 
and provide zero usage or residual values.  We use δ to denote a discount factor, which 
is common to both vendor and consumers.  We shall relax this assumption in Section 
2.5.  Note that 0 ≤ δ ≤1.  The larger δ is, the smaller the discount in future utilities or 
prices will be. 
9  We shall discuss the implications of positive marginal costs in Section 2.5. 
Each period in the model further consists of two stages.  In the first stage, the 
vendor makes product and pricing decisions based on its knowledge of consumer 
profiles (how many people bought the products in previous periods, the utilities they 
derive from the products, etc.). In the second stage, consumers make purchase 
decisions, taking into account their valuations for the products and expectations about 
future products.  There is common knowledge on demand, product quality, and 
technological improvement.  Perfect information on history of moves by the vendor 
and consumers is available.  We focus on rational expectations equilibria in which 
consumers form expectations about the product and pricing decisions of the vendor, 
and the vendor fulfills such expectations. 
We use a tuple {⋅, ⋅, ⋅} to represent the product strategies of the vendor in the 
three periods.  For example, {L, -, H} indicates that the vendor sells the old product in 
the first period, does not sell any product in the second period, and sells the new 
product in the third period.  Similarly, {L, H, -} denotes a similar strategy except that 
the new product is sold in the second period instead of the third.  Because consumers 
have identical valuations for products, the vendor would sell only one product in each 
period.  Further, once a product is sold in a period, it would not be sold in subsequent 
periods.10   
For each product strategy, the vendor needs to devise a price schedule.  An 
equilibrium is sub-game perfect if the vendor receives optimal profit from its product 
and price schedules, and if the schedules are consistent with consumer expectations.  
We use  to denote the price of product i at time t, where i = L, H and t = 1, 2, or 3, itp
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10  In a model where consumers have different valuations for products, or where new consumers enter 
the market in subsequent periods, it is possible for a vendor to sell both old and new products in the 
same period, and itmay also sell the same products over time. 
and Hutp  to denote the upgrade price of product H at time t, where t = 2 or 3 (upgrade 
price is necessary only for the new product, and the new product can only be sold at or 
after period 2). 
Given this setting, there are eight possible product strategies for the vendor, which are 
listed in the first column of Table 2.1.11  Our analysis proceeds as follows.  For each 
product strategy, we calculate the total utility that consumers can enjoy from using the 
sequence of products.  For example, consider the strategy {L, -, -}, where the vendor 
only sells the old product in the first period.  Consumers can enjoy a utility of qL in the 
first period, δ qL in the second period, δ2 qL in the third period, and so on, until δn-1 qL 
in the last period of the usable life span of the product.  Summing these values, the 
total utility that a consumer can enjoy, 







⎡ ⎤−= ⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
.      
The utilities that consumers can enjoy from other product strategies are calculated in a 
similar manner.  These are all listed in the second column of Table 2.1. 
<Insert Table 2.1 here> 
Then, based on the utility that consumers derive from each strategy, we compute an 
optimal price schedule and the associated profit that the vendor can make by choosing 
such a strategy.  Finally, the profits are compared across the eight product strategies to 
determine the optimal choices of the vendor.  We then characterize a few necessary 
                                                     
11  Note that the vendor would consider strategies {L, -, -} and {-, L, -} only when it can credibly 
commit to its chosen product strategies.  Otherwise, it would defect by subsequently selling the new 
product, and consumers would adjust their expectations to account for such anticipated defections.  In 
Section 6, we discuss the changes in our results when commitment is infeasible. 
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and sufficient conditions that lead to equilibria with delayed selling of the new 
product. 
2.4 Analysis 
When setting prices, the vendor has to consider consumer expectations and their 
possessions of products.  In particular, consumers would buy or upgrade to a new 
product if and only if the total surplus that they derive from the purchase or upgrade is 
positive (participation constraint) and is more than those from any other options (self-
selection constraint).  Further, consumers expect new products to be available in the 
future.  Hence, before they make a purchase, they would compare its prospect with that 
of waiting for a new product.  It is these considerations about consumer actions that 
limit the flexibility of pricing for the vendor. 
We separate our analysis into two scenarios.  In the first scenario, the vendor 
cannot provide an upgrade option to consumers; hence, all consumers pay the same 
price for the new product. In the second scenario, the vendor can devise an upgrade 
policy, which allows consumers to trade in the old product for the new product at a 
discounted price.  In subsequent analysis, we assume the vendor can make credible 
commitments on product strategies.  The case when it cannot make credible 
commitments is presented in Section 2.6. 
2.4.1 With No Upgrade Policies 
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2
When the vendor cannot identify consumers who have previously bought its product, 
or when the administrative cost of trade-in is too high, it is infeasible for him to offer 
an upgrade discount to consumers.  All consumers must then pay the same price for the 
new product, which means that 2
Hup p= H  and 3 3Hu Hp p= . 
Given the product strategies in Table 2.1, it is easy to calculate the price 
schedules and profits of the vendor.  For illustrative purpose, we present the results 
with respect to strategies {L, -, -} and {L, H, -} below.  The price schedules and profits 
of other strategies can be computed by following similar procedures. 
In strategy {L, -, -}, the vendor only sells the old product in period 1.  Its 
problem is: 
1
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.     (2.1) 
The left-hand side of (2.1) is the net surplus that consumers can enjoy by buying the 
product. Essentially, (2.1) is a participation constraint that ensures that consumers buy 
the old product in the first period.  Solving the above problem, we have:  
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.      
In strategy {L, H, -}, the vendor sells the old and new products in the first and 
second periods.  It has to set two prices: the price of the old product in period 1, , 




Hp .  Its profit maximization problem is 
then: 
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The left-hand side of (2.2)-(2.4) is the net surplus that consumers enjoy by buying both 
products.  Similar to (2.1), (2.2) is a participation constraint.  Both (2.3) and (2.4) are 
self-selection constraints; (2.3) prevents consumers from buying only the old product 
whereas (2.4) prevents them from skipping the old product and buying only the new 
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q ,    (2.5) 
and 1
L
Lp q≤ .       (2.6) 
(2.5) imposes a constraint on the feasible price of the new product.  Because the 
existing stock of the old product continues to provide service if consumers do not buy 
the new product, the vendor could only charge consumers for the incremental value the 
new product brings.  Further, (2.6) says that the price of the old product is bound too 
because expectations of future switch to the new product reduces the life span of and 
hence the price that consumers are willing to pay for the old product.  Essentially, (2.5) 
and (2.6) imply that if the vendor wants consumers to buy the new product but cannot 
offer an upgrade discount to existing customers, then it has to absorb the wastage 
associated with scrapping the old product prematurely (i.e., before the end of its 
physical life span).12
Solving the vendor’s problem subject to (2.2), (2.5) and (2.6), the optimal 
prices and profits are: 
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.   
Note that { , , } { , , }L H L Huπ − −< .  That is, if the vendor chooses to sell two products, then 
it has to leave consumers with positive surplus – the service values of the old product 
from the second period onwards would have to be a give-away to consumers.  This is 
always true whenever the two products are sold in the planning horizon and the vendor 
cannot implement an upgrade policy.  The price schedules of all product strategies and 
the associated profits for the vendor are reported in the third and fourth columns of 
Table 2.1. 
By inspecting the vendor’s profits, we see that strategy {L, -, -} dominates 
strategies {-, L, -} and {-, -, L}; strategy {L, H, -} dominates strategy {-, L, H}; and 
strategy {-, H, -} dominates strategy {-, -, H}.  That is, the vendor would not postpone 
selling the same sequences of products.  The only remaining strategies are {L, -, -}, {L, 
H, -}, {L, -, H}, and {-, H, -}.  Comparing the vendor’s profits across these four 
strategies, our first set of results follows.  The proofs of all propositions and corollaries 
are available in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 1 [Optimal product strategies with no upgrade policies]: 
Suppose that the vendor cannot implement an upgrade policy.13








−> − . 
                                                     
13  For brevity, we assume that the constraints are not binding.  If any one of the constraints is binding, 
then the vendor may choose more than one strategy with equal probability. 
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Corollary: As durability, n, increases, the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
delayed introduction become stronger.  When n , the delayed introduction 
strategy, {L, -, H}, is always dominated by one of the other three strategies. 
→∞
 
Figure 2.1 plots the ranges of parameters for each of the above strategies to be optimal 
under various durabilities.  Generally, three parameters characterize the incentives of 
the vendor to delay selling the new product: quality of the old product, qL (since we 
have normalized qH to one, qL also represents the degree of product improvement 
brought by the new technology; the smaller qL is, the larger the quality improvement 
will be), product durability, n, and discount factor, δ.  As Figure 2.1 clearly shows, the 
region for delayed introduction gradually shrinks as n increases, and is negligible when 
n is sufficiently large (say, n ≥ 10). 
<Insert Figure 2.1 here> 
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By the self-selection constraint (2.3) and hence the price constraint (2.5), it is 
clear that the existing stock of the old product imposes a negative externality on the 
new product.  Specifically, (2.5) limits the maximum price, which is dependent on the 
difference in service values provided by the two products at the time of evaluation, that 
consumers are willing to pay for the new product.  In strategy {L, -, H}, the old 
product is used in both periods 1 and 2.  Therefore, its residual value in period 3 is 
lower than that in period 2 in strategy {L, H, -}.  The vendor could then charge a 
higher price and earn more revenue for the new product.  This is confirmed by the fact 
that  in strategies {L, -, H} and {L, H, -}. HH pp 23 >
Further, by (2.4) and hence (2.6), the new product also imposes a negative 
externality on the old product.  This is because consumers expect to buy the new 
product and scrap the old product in the near future.  Hence, they are willing to pay 
only for periods in which the old product is in service (i.e., the new product causes 
premature obsolescence of the old product).  The longer consumers expect to use the 
old product, the more they are willing to pay for it.  Provided that the expected usage 
of the old product is less than its physical life span, however, the old product’s price 
would fall short of what it should deserve.  The vendor then has to subsidize 
consumers if it wants them to buy the new product before the old product becomes 
dysfunctional. 
Therefore, the vendor has to face mutual cannibalizations between the old and 
new products if it wants to sell both of them in the planning horizon.  To alleviate such 
cannibalizations, the vendor could either push back the selling of the new product, or 
remove the old product from the market.  The former action could lead to delayed 
appearance or even shelving of the new product.  The latter action could result in 
leapfrogging by the vendor, and only the new product would be sold in the second 
period; consumers would not be able to use the old product in the first period.  By 
Proposition 1, all of these outcomes are possible in equilibrium. 
If the vendor decides to sell both products but postpones sale of the new 
product to the last period, then two opposite forces would be in contention.  First, it 
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would collect revenue from the new product at a later period, which tends to act 
against delay.  Second, additional depreciation of the old product allows him to charge 
a higher price for the new product (i.e., the extent of cannibalization is now smaller).  
Also, because the old product is used for an extended period, the vendor could charge a 
higher price for it too.  These price effects tend to favor delay.  Whether delayed 
introduction is optimal largely depends on the balance of these two opposite forces.  
When the discount factor, δ, is large (i.e., the discount of future values is small, 
or equivalently, the vendor and consumers are patient), the first force above, owing to 
delayed revenue from the new product, becomes insignificant, and it may suggest that 
the vendor would prefer the delayed introduction strategy; this is indeed consistent 
with the findings of Kornish (2001) and Radas and Shugan (1998).  Interestingly, this 
is not always the case in our setting because besides the two full product line 
strategies, {L, H, -} and {L, -, H}, the vendor may also choose to shelf either the old or 
new product – after all, this is the most effective way to completely resolve the 
cannibalizations between the products!  In general, low quality improvement tends to 
raise the attractiveness of the status quo strategy, {L, -, -}, and high quality 
improvement, together with a high discount factor, tends to raise the attractiveness of 
leapfrogging, {-, H, -}.  Delaying sale of the new product within the planning horizon 
does not necessarily follow a high discount factor.14
By contrast, we find that durability, n, and product improvement, qL, are 
stronger predictors of delayed introduction.  In particular, if both products are durable, 
14  Kornish (2001) and Radas and Shugan (1998) do not consider the possibility of selling only one 
product in the planning horizon.  Therefore, their conclusion that the choice of delay is tied to the 
discount factor is not generalizable to other product line strategies.  As we shall illustrate below, 
however, the role of the discount factor in predicting delay is significant when the vendor can implement 
an upgrade policy. 
and if the new product is somewhat better than the old one, then the gain brought by 
lower cannibalization (the second force above) is minor.  The new product prices with 
and without delay,  for {L, -, H} and  for {L, H, -}, are large but similar, 
however, and hence the loss associated with deferral of revenue from selling the new 
product is big.  The vendor would then prefer to sell the new product as soon as 
possible, i.e., strategy {L, H, -} becomes optimal. 
Hp3
Hp2
Proposition 1 characterizes the conditions – low durability and incremental (but 
not radical) quality improvement – for delayed introduction of new products.  These 
conditions seem to match the features of many high technology products, such as 
MP3-compatible home stereo systems or DVD video recorders, and hence, may 
explain why their vendors often launch new products later, even though the enabling 
advanced technologies are already available. 
2.4.2 With an Upgrade Policy 
We now consider the case when a vendor can implement an upgrade policy.  The 
provision of the upgrade option is an extra instrument for a vendor to exercise price 
discrimination based on purchase history (Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Lee and Lee 
1998).  If the vendor can identify consumers who have bought the old product, it can 
charge them for only the incremental utility that they receive by using the new product.  
For those who do not own the old product, it can charge them for the full utility.  In our 
setting, because all consumers are identical, they exhibit the same behavior in 
equilibrium.  Nevertheless, upgrade is relevant because the vendor can now make a 
credible threat that if the consumers do not buy the old product in the first period, they 
will face a very high price for the new product in subsequent periods (cf. those who 
trade in the old product for the new product).  This threat of price discrimination 
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dissuades consumers from leapfrogging and encourages them to buy the old product as 
soon as it is available for sale. 
The analyses with an upgrade policy resemble those that we have presented 
above; in the five product strategies with single products, the price schedules and 
profits are identical to the previous case with no upgrade policies.  The prices and the 
vendor’s profits in strategies {L, H, -}, {L, -, H} and {-, L, H}, however, differ from 
those that we have obtained above.  For illustrative purpose, we present the results 
with respect to strategy {L, H, -} below. 
In strategy {L, H, -}, the vendor needs to set three prices: the price of the old 
product in period 1, , the price of the new product in period 2, , and the upgrade 




15   The vendor’s profit maximization 






































































































































The left-hand side of (2.7)-( 2.9) is the net surplus that consumers enjoy by buying the 
old product in period 1 and upgrading to the new product in period 2.  Similar to (2.1), 
                                                     
15   The vendor needs to specify the new product price in period 2 to prevent consumers from 
leapfrogging.  As we shall show below, it makes more profits by selling the two products sequentially 
(offering an upgrade discount to those who own the old product) than by only selling the new product in 
period 2. 
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(2.7) is a participation constraint.  (2.8) is a self-selection constraint that restricts the 
upgrade price, and (2.9) is the constraint that ensures consumers do not leapfrog by 
skipping the old product.  Solving the profit maximization problem, the optimal prices 





















































































HL qqq .  
Note that },,{},,{ −− = HLHL uπ . That is, the vendor can extract all surplus from consumers.  
This result holds whenever the vendor can implement an upgrade policy.  The price 
schedules of all product strategies are reported in the fifth column of Table 2.1.  With 
an upgrade policy, the profits of the vendor always equal the consumer utilities in the 
second column of Table 2.1. 
Similar to the case with no upgrade policies (Section 2.4.1), the vendor would 
not delay selling the same sequences of products.  With an upgrade policy, strategy {L, 
H, -} further dominates strategies {L, -, -} and {-, H, -}.  The only remaining strategies 
are the two with full product lines, {L, H, -} and {L, -, H}.  Our second proposition 
follows. 
 
Proposition 2 [Optimal product strategies with an upgrade policy]: 
Suppose that the vendor can implement an upgrade policy. 
• [Immediate sale]: Strategy {L, H, -} is optimal if and only if  nLq δ−<1 .
• [Delayed Introduction]: Strategy {L, -, H} is optimal if and only if  nLq δ−> 1 .
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Corollary: As n increases or δ decreases, the necessary and sufficient condition for 
delayed introduction becomes stronger.  When ∞→n  or 0→δ , delayed introduction 
is not optimal; the vendor would always sell the new product as soon as it is available. 
 
Figure 2.2 depicts the condition in Proposition 2.  The implications of Proposition 2 
are similar to those of Proposition 1, except that the discount factor now plays a more 
important role.  The interpretations are straightforward – if quality improvement is 
low, the discount factor is large, or durability is low, then delayed selling of the new 
product is more likely; otherwise, the vendor would launch the new product 
immediately.  The intuitions of these findings follow directly from those that we have 
presented in the previous section. 
<Insert Figure 2.2 here> 
Note the old product’s prices in period 1 in Table 2.1 – they are much higher 
than those in the case when the vendor cannot implement an upgrade policy.  Recall 
that if the vendor sells both products, then the new product may cause premature 
obsolescence of the old product because the latter is scrapped before the end of its 
physical life span.  The provision of an upgrade policy could internalize such an 
externality because even though the old product is retired before the end of its physical 
life span, it allows its owner to buy the new product at a discounted price.  Hence, the 
old product provides a higher value (cf. that in the no upgrade case) to consumers, and 
the vendor can now charge for its full value.  It is also because of this trade-in value of 
the old product that the vendor does not prefer the single-product strategies – it could 
always capture all consumer surplus associated with using the products, which is 
bigger than that in the single-product strategies {L, -, -} and {-, H, -}. 
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Finally, with an upgrade policy, the vendor’s choices in the equilibria are 
socially efficient, including those that involve delayed introductions!  This is because 
if the new product is sold too early, the old product, which could still provide useful 
service to consumers, would be retired prematurely.  This means that useful resources 
are wasted, which causes inefficiency in welfare. 16   Note further that efficient 
outcomes are not guaranteed when an upgrade policy is not feasible because the 
vendor’s desperate effort to resolve the two-way cannibalizations between its products 
may cause him to drift away from socially optimal actions. 
2.5 Extensions 
In this section, we relax a few assumptions that we have made in the above analyses.  
First, we allow the old and new products to be of different durabilities and study how 
the vendor’s choice of strategies changes when the relative durability of the products 
varies. 
Generally, a more durable product provides a longer stream of services to 
consumers, who would then be willing to pay more for the product.  If the durability of 
the new product, nH, is high relative to that of the old product, nL, then the total utility 
that consumers enjoy by buying or upgrading to the new product, and hence the prices 
that the vendor could charge for it, becomes a more important decision factor.  If the 
new product is sold later, the loss in revenue because of the discount factor is 
significant.  The intertemporal cannibalizations between the products are not affected, 
however, by the durability of the new product.  Hence, ceteris paribus, increases in nH 
relative to nL would entice the vendor to sell the new product earlier, or, if originally it 
16  Although with delayed introduction consumers cannot use the new product immediately, they can 
extend usage of the products into a more distant future.  Specifically, they can use the (old and new) 
products for n + 2 periods with strategy {L, -, H}, but only n + 1 periods with strategy {L, H, -}.  
preferred the status quo strategy (in the scenario with no upgrade policies), to 
reconsider introducing the new product within the planning horizon. 
By contrast, if nH decreases relative to nL, the loss in revenue for selling the 
new product later is lower because now the new product is worth less to consumers.  
Cannibalization rises to become a potent threat, and as a result, the vendor would more 
likely postpone sale of the new product.  In the extreme case where the new product 
has a substantially shorter life span than the old product, the vendor may even decide 
not to sell the new product in the planning horizon.  We summarize these intuitions in 
the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3 [Change in durabilities]: 
Suppose that nH increases relative to nL. 
• The necessary and sufficient conditions for the status quo and delayed 
introduction strategies, {L, -, -} and {L, -, H}, become stronger.  The vendor is 
less likely to shelf or delay sale of the new product. 
• If the vendor originally chose not to sell the new product, it is now possible for 
him to re-introduce it in the planning horizon and sell it in the last period. 
The opposite is true if nH decreases relative to nL.  If 2−< LH nn , it is possible for the 
vendor to shelf the new product (i.e., choose the status quo strategy) even though it is 
able to devise an upgrade policy.  
 
Figure 2.3 shows the changes in the feasible region of each product strategy when the 
durability of the new product changes relative to that of the old product. 
<Insert Figure 2.3 here> 
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We next consider the case where the vendor and consumers have different discount 
factors.  Let the discount factor of the vendor be θ and that of consumers be δ.  
Intuitively, one might think that a less patient vendor (i.e., θ is smaller) would sell the 
new product as soon as possible to capture a higher discounted revenue.  This 
conjecture is indeed correct if the vendor can implement an upgrade policy.  
Interestingly, if an upgrade policy is not viable, a decrease in θ may induce the vendor 
to shelf the new product even though it might have originally planned to sell it!  This is 
because the new product reduces the price that it could charge for the old product in 
the first period, which is now more important owing to a higher discount of future 
revenue.  
Recall that with an upgrade policy, the vendor could internalize the 
cannibalization caused by the new product, and could always charge the full price for 
the old product.  Hence the change in the discount factor only affects the incremental 
revenue that it receives from those who upgrade to the new product.  A lower discount 
factor (i.e., a higher discount of future revenue) would naturally prompt him to launch 
the new product earlier. 
By contrast, with no upgrade policies, the reverse cannibalization from the new 
product to the old one is significant.  The vendor then has to balance carefully the gain 
from launching the new product in the future against the loss in first period revenue 
from the old product.  If it is less patient (i.e., when θ decreases), its concern about the 
old product’s price is higher than that about the new product’s price.  Hence, it has a 
higher tendency to shelf the new product and a lower tendency to leapfrog.  The choice 
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of delayed introduction against immediate sale and leapfrogging is, however, 
ambiguous.17  We summarize these results in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4 [Change in discount factors]: 
Suppose that the vendor’s discount factor, θ, decreases relative to that of the 
consumers, δ. 
• With no upgrade policies, the necessary and sufficient conditions for status quo 
become weaker.  The vendor has a higher tendency to shelf the new product.  
Its choice over the other three product strategies is ambiguous. 
• With an upgrade policy, the sufficient condition for delayed introduction 
becomes stronger.  The vendor has a higher tendency to sell the new product 
earlier. 
 
Figure 2.4 shows the changes in the feasible region of each product strategy when the 
discount factor of the vendor decreases relative to that of the consumers.   
<Insert Figure 2.4 here> 
Finally, we assume zero marginal costs for both the old and new products.  If marginal 
cost is positive and correlates with product quality, its impact on the vendor’s product 
strategies is straightforward: if cost increases with quality, then selling the new product 
17  The vendor’s revenue from selling the new product in delayed introduction involves a second-order 
discount, which reduces its revenue rapidly as θ decreases.  Further, in the delayed introduction strategy, 
its revenue from selling the old product is also a function of the consumers’ discount factor, δ.  The 
effect of a change in θ relative to δ depends on their relative magnitude.  If θ is large, decreases in θ 
would make the new product substantially less attractive; hence, delay is less appealing to the vendor.  
By contrast, if θ is small, a further decrease does not make much difference, and delay could be 
preferred because it increases the old product’s price.  Therefore, the vendor does not unequivocally 
prefer or avoid delayed introduction (cf. immediate sale and leapfrogging). 
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is less attractive to the vendor (cf. the case that we have analyzed in Section 2.4), and it 
may delay its sale or shelf it.  The opposite is true if cost decreases with quality – it 
may launch it earlier, or in the extreme case, leapfrog and skip the old product.  What 
is more interesting here is that a high marginal cost for the new product may make 
upgrade less lucrative for the vendor because other than participation and self-selection 
constraints, there is an additional cost constraint in the vendor’s maximization problem 
that places a lower bound on the upgrade price that is set by the vendor.  An immediate 
conjecture is that the conditions for the vendor to provide upgrade discounts to existing 
customers would become more stringent, and it would more likely choose product 
strategies that involve selling only one product in the planning horizon.  To prove this 
result, however, we need a more general model with various marginal costs and 
endogenous choices of upgrade policies.  We leave this problem to future research. 
2.6 No Commitment 
What happen if the vendor cannot make credible commitment on product strategies?  
Note that the vendor always has incentives to launch the new product after the old 
product was sold in an earlier period.  When it cannot credibly commit not to sell the 
new product in the future, consumers would adjust their expectations and refuse to pay 
a high price for the old product.  Therefore, when commitment is incredible, it is not 
possible for the vendor to obtain the price and profit in the first row of Table 2.1 from 
the old product.  Accordingly, it would always sell the new product, and strategy {L, -, 
-} would not constitute an equilibrium.  Proposition One needs to be slightly revised – 
the status quo strategy is no longer stable.  In equilibrium, with no upgrade policies, 
the vendor would choose either leapfrogging, immediate sale, or delayed introduction.  
Further, when there is no commitment, delayed introduction is always optimal under 
some conditions even if the durability, n, becomes very large (cf. Corollary One, where 
delayed introduction is not optimal when ∞→n ).  
The results with an upgrade policy (i.e., Proposition 2) are not sensitive to the 
assumption on commitment, because in equilibrium the vendor would always sell both 
the old and new products.  Hence, regardless of whether the vendor can make credible 
commitment, consumers always expect to buy both products, and the vendor fulfills 
such an expectation by setting the corresponding prices.  Finally, Propositions Three 
and Four need to be revised.  Again, status quo is no longer an equilibrium strategy; 
the vendor would not shelf the new product. 
Note that when there is no commitment the vendor makes less profit in some 
parameter ranges.  This resembles the standard result of durable goods monopolists 
being worse off because of the inability to commit to restricting output in future 
periods (e.g., Bulow 1982, Coase 1972).  Generally, commitment ameliorates the time 
inconsistency problem, and this feature persists when we exclusively consider the 
timing of sale of new products (cf. output choices, which is often studied in the 
literature). 
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
Using a three-period model, we have shown that a monopolistic vendor would at times 
prefer to delay introducing a new product, even if technologies for the product are 
already developed and it is costless to sell it to consumers.  This is because the old and 
new products affect each other adversely, which is similar to cannibalizations in 
standard product differentiation studies (e.g., Moorthy 1984; Moorthy and Png 1992; 
Mussa and Rosen 1978).  In the product differentiation literature, the vendor mitigates 
cannibalizations by dispersing its products; in our setting, it postpones selling the new 
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product.  We have characterized a few equilibria with delayed introduction of the new 
product, and studied their changes with respect to market and product parameters. 
 
The findings of our study are relevant to high-technology products because their 
quality and life spans are increasingly being determined by external forces, such as 
developments in peripheral components, communications standards, or hardware and 
software architectures. In particular, vendors of these products often cannot control 
when new technologies arrive and when their old products become obsolete.  Hence, 
for them, product innovation and introduction are two separate decisions – they might 
not be able to endogenize the extent of product innovation, but they could always 
control whether and when to sell new products.  Because of this separation of sale 
from innovation, we find that in social optimum, a vendor may defer introducing a new 
product.  It also explains why in some markets, vendors do not deploy new and 
superior technologies to create new products.  The inclusion of durability as a model 
parameter allows us to extend our insights directly to products that exhibit different life 
spans (perhaps because of high dependencies on external parts, technologies, or 
trends).  Relaxing the conventional assumption of infinite durability, our results 
suggest that delayed product introduction can be advantageous even when upgrade 
policy is feasible, an insight that cannot be obtained in prior studies of product 
introduction with assumption of infinite durability (Fishman and Rob 2000; Lee and 
Lee 1998; Waldman 1996a) 18.   
18  For example, in Fishman and Rob’s (2000) model, if a vendor can offer an upgrade discount, with 
infinite durability, the timing decisions of new products are always socially optimal.  That is, there is no 
“delay” in welfare maximizing equilibria.  
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Our findings provide interesting insights for pricing and policy formulations.  
First, uniform pricing of new products is not desirable – a vendor should seek to 
provide upgrade discounts to existing customers whenever feasible.  Second, if a 
vendor cannot control product durability, planned obsolescence that suppresses the 
value of old products (Bulow 1986; Waldman 1993, 1996b) may not be feasible.  
Rather than desperately removing old products from the market, the vendor could 
launch new products later; this enhances the prices of both products and could 
sometimes result in higher profits.  Third, although stipulating minimum levels of 
durability could lead to slower technological progress (Fishman and Robs 2000), it 
allows consumers to enjoy new products earlier, provided that the enabling 
technologies for the new products are available.  Hence, it may benefit consumers, if 
for example, protracted licenses of 3G cellular networks are awarded to 
telecommunications companies, or long service contracts are extended to pay-TV 
operators and broadband Internet service providers.  Finally, facilitating upgrade or 
trade-in is especially important in encouraging an impatient vendor to launch better 
products.  Measures that help such a vendor administer trade-in (e.g., reinforcing the 
credibility of buyback guarantees) or policies that support renting instead of selling a 
product are useful; those that prohibit the vendor from discriminating against new 
customers or retaining controls on old products should generally be avoided. 
This study contributes to the literature of technology adoption by analyzing 
both the vendor’s and consumers’ economic incentives of adopting a new and better 
technology. Venkatesh and Brown (2001) suggest that rapid technology improvement 
and the fear for obsolescence have been the major concerns that dissuade consumers 
from purchasing a product. Based on their insights, we move forward by measuring 
obsolescence through the quality improvement embodied in the new product and the 
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duration over which the product can provide usable services and analyze the strategic 
interaction between vendor and consumers. Our findings suggest that the extent of 
quality improvement and product’s usable lifespan are two important factors which 
positively affect vendor and consumers’ incentives to adopt new and better technology. 
This study also extends the research on durable goods monopolists.  Similar to 
that literature (e.g., Bulow 1982, 1986; Levinthal and Purohit 1989; Waldman 1993, 
1996b), the vendor in our study faces a time inconsistency problem.  Departing from 
that literature, however, it cannot resolve the problem by adjusting output, R&D 
investment, or durability (all of these are moot in this study).  Instead, it can 
manipulate timing of sale.  As advocated by Waldman (2003, p.140), “the problem of 
time inconsistency is potentially more important for other choices than for output”.  
We have certainly shown that timing of sale per se is yet another such “other choices”, 
and it deserves more attention because vendors have high degrees of freedom in 
determining when to sell new products (cf. choices of R&D, durability, or planned 
obsolescence that are often not subject to control by vendors because of external 
research, or the political and market environments). 
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Appendix 2A-1 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
By comparing the profits of the seller across the four strategies {L, -, -}, {L, H, -}, {L, 
-, H}, and {-, H, -} in Table 2.1, we have the following set of inequalities: 
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]1[]1[ .      (2A6) 
(2A1) to (2A3) together define the necessary and sufficient conditions for qL, δ, and n 
such that the seller would prefer the status quo strategy.  Similarly, (2A3), (2A5) and 
(2A6) define the conditions for leapfrogging; (2A1), (2A4) and (2A5) define the 
conditions for immediate sale; and (2A2), (2A4) and (2A6) define the conditions for 
delayed introduction. 
 




































Hence, the feasible region of qL for delayed introduction shrinks when n increases.  













This implies that no values of qL and δ could fulfill all three necessary conditions for 
delayed introduction.  In other words, the seller would always choose one of the other 
three strategies instead of the delayed introduction strategy.  [] 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
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if and only if .  For the corollary, it suffices to show that: nLq δ−< 1
 0ln]1[ >−=− δδδ nn
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d δδδ . 
Also, 




and  is always positive when δ is close to but does not equal zero.  
Therefore, 
]}1[{ nLq δδ −−−
},,{},,{ HLHL −− > ππ  when ∞→n  or 0→δ .  [] 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
We first consider the case with no upgrade policies.  When LH nn ≠ , the profits of the 
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Comparing these four profit functions, we have the following set of inequalities:  
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},,{},,{ −−− > HHL ππ  if and only if ,   (2A15) 021 >+− Lnδδ








]1[]1[ .  (2A16) 
Similar to (2A1) to (2A6), (2A11) to (2A16) define a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for each product strategy to be optimal for the seller.  In particular, the 
constraints that define the joint region (see Figure 2.1) for the status quo and delayed 

























Given fixed nL, the terms on the right-hand side of the three inequalities above increase 
with nH, which means that the region for status quo and delayed introduction contracts 
with nH.  Further, the boundary between these two strategies is defined by (2A12), 
which becomes more stringent as nH increases.  That is, the seller may shift from status 
quo to delayed introduction. 
 
We next consider the case with an upgrade policy.  When LH nn ≠ , three strategies 
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LHL q .     (2A19) 
As long as , strategy {L, -, -} is always dominated.  The necessary and 
sufficient condition for delayed introduction becomes 
2−≥ LH nn
},,{},,{ −− > HLHL ππ , or: 
 .        (2A20) HnLq δ−> 1
Note that nL does not appear in (2A20).  This is because with an upgrade policy, the 
seller could internalize obsolescence of the old product brought by the new product 
and capture the full utility that consumers place on the old product.  The decision of 
whether to delay selling the new product then depends on the value that it brings to 
consumers, which is a function of nH.  As (2A20) clearly shows, the condition for 
delayed introduction is stronger when nH increases, which means that it is more likely 
for the seller to launch the new product when its durability or life span increases. 
 










δ .       (2A21) 
Hence, if the durability of the new product is substantially lower than that of the old 
product, the status quo strategy could emerge as an optimal strategy for the seller (cf. 
Proposition 2).  As in (2A20), if nH decreases, the chance for the seller to prefer 
delayed introduction of the new product increases.  In the extreme case, when (2A21) 
is satisfied (perhaps because the old product’s quality is similar to that of the new 
product), he might even shelf the new product even though he is able to offer an 
upgrade policy.  [] 
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 Proof of Proposition 4. 
We first consider the case with no upgrade policies.  When δθ ≠ , the profits of the 










































































H .       (2A25) 
Comparing these four profit functions, we have the following set of inequalities:  
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},,{},,{ −−−− > HL ππ  if and only if θ>Lq ,     (2A28) 
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δθθ .  (2A31) 
Comparing against (2A1) to (2A3), it is obvious that when δθ < , the necessary and 
sufficient conditions (2A26) to (2A28) for {L, -, -} to be optimal become weaker. 
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We next consider the case with an upgrade policy.  When δθ ≠ , as in Proposition 2, 
the seller would only choose either {L, H, -} or {L, -, H} in equilibrium.  The 








δθ .      (2A32)  
Compared with , it is clear that the right-hand side of (2A32) is larger when ]1[ nδ− δθ < , 
i.e., it is more likely for the seller to choose immediate sale when he is impatient. [] 
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Appendix 2A-2 
Table 2.1 Product Strategies, Prices and Profits 
Product 
strategy Consumer utility
+ Price schedule 
with no upgrade policies 
Monopolist’s profit  
with no upgrade policies 
Price schedule  
with an upgrade policy++
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+ Since qH = 1, it is omitted from all utility functions. 









 Figure 2.2. Optimal Product Strategies with an Upgrade Policy 
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(a) When nH increases relative to nL
 
 
(b) When nH decreases relative to nL 
 
Figure 2.3. Optimal Product Strategies with Different Durabilities 
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TECHNOLOGY TIMING AND PRICING IN THE 
PRESENCE OF AN INSTALLED BASE 
3.1 Introduction 
Firms in the information technology (IT) industry face a paradox of rapid 
technological progress: To sustain ongoing industry leadership, a firm should strive to 
develop the next best technology (Mohr, Sengupta and Slater 2005). However, on one 
hand, the firm’s newly improved technology renders obsolete its older technology, 
further contributing to competitive volatility. On the other hand, the installed base of 
its own products adopting the older technology turns to be a formidable competitor to 
the new technology, particularly when technological progress outpaces users’ capacity 
of fully utilizing technology (Varian 2004). Although both hardware and software 
vendors make a significant proportion of their revenue by selling users newer versions 
of what the users already have, many users are increasingly resisting the purchase of 
upgrades solely for the sake of upgrading (Richter 1995). Thanks to the accumulation 
of past purchases and the durable nature of many information goods, the number of 
existing installed units can be an order of magnitude greater than the number sold 
annually (Wise and Baumgartner 1999). Examples include 3G cellular phone facilities 
and services versus a large group of existing users who are using their second-
generation cellular networks and handsets; DVD video recorders versus the installed 
base of conventional videotape recorders. In the personal computer (PC) and 
mainframe computer industry, a major concern for vendors is to tackle the reluctance 
of individuals or business users to replace old PCs or mainframes by newer ones 
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(McDonald 2006). Even for computer software, with more than 90% of PCs running 
some sort of Windows, Microsoft has long considered its main competitor to be the 
installed base of its own products (Berlind 2005).  
 Being aware of baulking users caused by rapid technology improvement 
(Dhebar 1996), prior research in new product introduction suggests that to attract users 
to upgrade their old products, vendor has the incentivbelow e to reduce product 
durability (Bulow 1986, Waldman 1996b). If the vendor is unable to artificially 
shorten the durability of its products, offering upgrade price discounts to existing users 
can raise its profit and at the same time attain socially optimal outcomes (Waldman 
1997, Fishman and Rob 2000).  
 In information goods industries, new business models are replacing the 
traditional shipment-based sales model in order to reduce product durability, thus 
eliminate the negative effect of the installed base (Rappa 2006). Information goods 
either are made up of “bits” or work in the digital form. Given the lack of physical 
constraints on production and operation, and being facilitated by the Internet, a few 
software vendors have managed to control durability by licensing their software or 
providing periodic services.  E.g., Microsoft’s software subscription model, 
Graphsoft’s “pay per use”, and the more recent “software as a service” (SaaS) model 
adopted by SalesForce.com. Even hardware vendors have gone downstream along the 
supply chain towards providing services required to operate and maintain products19. 
Despite their various forms, all of these business models aim at generating perpetual 
revenue streams by transforming durable products into subscription-based services – a 
form of ‘leasing’. 
19 Successful examples include IBM global services, Nokia’s integrated solution, and Dell’s hybrid 
manufacturing and direct distribution (Wise and Baumgartner 1999). 
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Nevertheless, transforming business model may not solve the conflict between 
existing installed base and new products. Users’ complaints about “forced upgrades” 
have never ceased. By paying a recurring fee in exchange for an always up-to-date 
application, users are likely to spend more in the long run (Kandra 2006). On the 
vendor’s side, many software vendors are unwilling to provide free upgrades even if 
the users have subscribed to renewable annual services20. Further, opposite to the 
advocates of SaaS, IT consultants have pointed out that SaaS applies best to 
applications that can be run in isolation, but would not be good for mission critical 
applications nor make large gains where there is data exchange between service 
providers and clients (Ferravanti 2004, James 2006). As for the downstream move 
mentioned above, it makes sense only for some particular combination of market 
structure and product characteristics21 (Wise and Baumgartner 1999).  
Compared to the analysis of shortening durability or its variations, studies on 
timing and pricing strategies to cope with installed base are lacking. Most of the 
existing research on product line introduction employs a two-period framework, which 
assumes fixed introduction timing for the new product (launching in the second period 
or not launching) (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole 1998). This restricted setting constrains 
the vendor’s wisdom in selling the new product facing a certain installed base of its 
older product: it can induce consumers’ self-selection of whether or not to purchase the 
new product in the second period, but not when to purchase it. This is especially 
20 PC World magazine reported the upgrade confusion and pressure to upgrade from the users of 
Symantec’s Norton Antivirus, Intuit’s Quicken, Microsoft’s Money, Corel’s Jasc Photo Album and 
Mathsoft’s Math CAD, etc.  http://www.pcworld.com/howto/article/0,aid,123396,00.asp 
21 Wise and Baumgartner (1999) provide a matrix to scope out a downstream opportunity. For instance, 
a downstream move in VCR market is not attractive considering its low installed-base-to-new-unit ratio 
and the trivial costs associated with VCR ownership and usage. 
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unrealistic considering the fact that vendors often use timing to segment the market. 
Recurrent model or continuous-time models have also been applied in studying 
technology innovation and product introduction. However, to make the models 
tractable, the researchers either assume consumers are homogeneous in valuation of 
product quality (Fishman and Rob 2000), or just study a single product introduction 
(Stokey 1979).  
Generally, the theoretical limitations of prior research lie in the followings.  
• First, previous studies mostly focus on static analysis of the demand in a market 
consisting of consumers differing in valuation of product quality and purchase history.  
Little research has addressed the same issue in consideration of the time dimension. 
The complexity of the demand side lies not only in the heterogeneity among 
consumers, but also the market as a carrier of history and the future. It is unclear how 
existing consumers’ intention to upgrade changes over time, and how the time trend of 
intention to upgrade differs among consumer segments.  
• Second, given the differing demand for upgrade, upgrade pricing has never been 
studied along the time dimension. In particular, how should vendors respond to the 
demand variation by leveraging intertemporal or intra-temporal price discrimination?  
Third, it has long been considered that with upgrade pricing, vendors will adopt 
socially efficient strategies (Waldman 1997, Lee and Lee 1998, Fishman and Rob 
2000). In this study, with a more general setting that encompasses consumer’s 
heterogeneity in valuation of product quality (cf. the high heterogeneity setting in Lee 
and Lee (1998), or the homogeneous setting in Fishman and Rob (2000)), are there 
situations where upgrade pricing loses its power to segment the market? If so, can 
vendors sustain their monopoly power using time as a discrimination instrument? 
 68
This study addresses the above pending questions, and investigates alternative 
strategies instead of changing durability to alleviate the cannibalization from installed 
base. Specifically, we investigate the optimal combinations of timing, pricing and 
product line strategies that the vendor can employ for selling its newly improved 
product in the presence of an installed base. Two cases: a fully-covered installed base 
and a partly-covered installed base are studied in a two-period framework with users 
differing in their valuation of product quality and purchase history, and with a 
monopolistic vendor selling sequential versions of products with exogenous durability 
and quality, and zero unit-varied cost. Our contributions are as following: 
First, in the full ranges of the extent of user heterogeneity and the extent of 
quality improvement, we characterize the market with either a partly- or fully- covered 
installed base in terms of users’ relative willingness to pay for the newly improved 
version and their relative payoffs from delayed purchase across periods.  
Second, different from the conventional proposition of constant user 
reservation price, we propose that if users have already owned an existing (old) version 
of a durable product, their willingness to purchase the newly improved version indeed 
increases over time! This effect interweaved with user heterogeneities on valuation of 
quality and on purchase history can enable a perfect intertemporal price discrimination 
by which the low valuation users who have not yet purchase any product will purchase 
the newly improved version earlier than the high valuation users who have owned the 
previous version. Further, the high valuation users’ incentive to postpone purchase 
may actually make them worse off, which is contrary to popular findings in the price 
discrimination literature (e.g., Moorthy 1984, Moorthy and Png 1992). 
Third, we find that vendor may delay the introduction of the newly improved 
version because of the combined dampening effects of the installed base and 
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heterogeneous users’ anticipation of future price reduction. The equilibria of such 
delayed introduction exist regardless of the extent of user heterogeneity and the extent 
of quality improvement between the sequential versions of products. 
Fourth, extending the prior research on upgrade pricing to a more general 
setting, we find that upgrade pricing is not able to segment users with different 
purchase history when user heterogeneity is sufficiently high. In case of that, instead of 
upgrade pricing, the vendor would maximize its profit via intertemporal price 
discrimination, or delayed introduction, or pooling pricing, depending on the 
characteristics of market structure and technology improvement. 
Five, we suggest that without the concern about cost, social welfare directly 
depends on whether the vendor can sustain its monopoly power facing the mutual 
cannibalization between the old and new products and the mutual arbitrage between 
the heterogeneous users.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 reviews the related 
literature.  Section 3.3 presents our research model.  Section 3.4 outlines the analysis 
and characterizes all equilibria in the case of a fully-covered installed base. Section 3.5 
presents the analysis and equilibria in the case of a partly-covered installed base with 
and without an upgrade policy. Section 3.6 concludes the study. 
3.2 Prior Literature 
Our research is grounded on the extensive literature of durable goods monopoly, and is 
related to two streams of works in economics and marketing. One stream of research is 
about market segmentation and price discrimination spawned by Mussa and Rosen 
(1978), Stokey (1979) and Moorthy (1984); the other stream is about planned 
obsolescence triggered by Coasian Dynamics (Coase 1972). The former studies the 
vendor’s strategic choices of timing and quality allocation to extract the surplus of 
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users with heterogeneous valuations for product quality (Moorthy and Png 1992, 
Padmanabhan, et.al. 1997). The latter studies the vendor’s incentive to eliminate the 
stock of the old durable good and the welfare effects of physical obsolescence (induced 
by the reduction in durability) (Bulow 1982, 1986, Waldman 1996a) and economic 
obsolescence (induced by new product introduction) (Waldman 1993, 1996b, Lee and 
Lee 1998, Fishman, et.al., 1993, Fishman and Rob 2000). Despite their different 
focuses, these two streams of works are closely related to each other in the context of 
new product introduction since their studied agents share the common characteristics: a 
durable-good monopolist seeking to sustain its monopoly power, and a group of users 
having rational expectations. 
 
The literature on new product introduction is founded on a conventional assumption 
that all users possess nothing at the beginning of the game (Kornish 2001). Our study 
relaxes this assumption and generalizes the utility function of users by considering 
various scenarios pertaining to their possession of a low-quality product at the 
beginning of the game. This captures the strategic interaction of vendor and users in 
the presence of an installed base, and at the same time simplifies the analysis of a 
multi-period game22.  
 
The stream of research on market segmentation and price discrimination has shown 
that if the monopolist is unable to identify users with heterogeneous valuation of 
quality, it could try to induce users’ self-selection by offering a menu of qualities 
22 To study a multi-period game (more than two periods) in a market with heterogeneous consumers can 
be very complicated because of the exponential increase of the number of combinations of timing, 
pricing and product line strategies. Hence, prior research with multi-period model settings simplified 
their models to a market with homogeneous consumers (e.g., Fishman and Rob 2000, Ruize 2003) 
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simultaneously (Mussa and Rosen 1978), i.e., static price discrimination, or a sequence 
of prices for the same product over time (Stokey 1979), i.e., intertemporal price 
discrimination.  In the context where the monopolist is able to commit its price and 
quality trajectories, Salant (1989) addresses the optimality of inducing users’ self-
selection by synthesizing the works conducted by Stokey (1979), Mussa and Rosen 
(1978) and Spence (1977, 1980). He proposes that inducing self-selection is 
suboptimal with linear costs but may be advantageous when users have linear 
valuations for quality, and when marginal costs are convex in quality. With aspect to 
static price discrimination, Moorthy (1984) proves that the users with the highest 
valuation of quality get the socially efficient product quality, while the lower valuation 
types would be inefficiently served. Moorthy and Png (1992) examine the interaction 
of quality discrimination and intertemporal price discrimination in a two-period model 
with the new technology being available at the beginning of the game. They find that 
employing both time and quality as the instruments to extract users’ surplus 
(sequentially selling two products to the high and low valuation users respectively) is 
optimal only if cannibalization is a problem and users are relatively more impatient 
than the vendor. Further, they show that when pre-commitment is infeasible, this 
sequential selling is less attractive compared with the case with commitment because 
the vendor’s private incentive of maximizing profits in the second period makes itself 
worse off in the first period (i.e., the vendor faces a time inconsistency problem).  
In the above studies, technology innovation is not the main concern. Thus, once 
any consumer has purchased one unit of the product, she will leave the market forever 
(Moorthy and Png 1992). This is similar to the first case that we study in this chapter – 
a fully-covered installed base, where users in the market only differ in their valuation 
of quality but not their purchase history. The difference is that we assume all users 
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hold the low-quality product at the beginning of the game. We shall investigate the 
optimality of intertemporal price discrimination in this context. 
Prior research considers users’ repeat purchase when technology improvement renders 
the existing technology obsolete. A general setting that has often been studied in this 
literature is a two-period model in which the vendor can only sell the low-quality (old) 
product in the first period; at the beginning of the second period, due to technology 
innovation, the vendor can produce and sell the high-quality (new) product.  
The studies on market segmentation and price discrimination are interested in 
deriving the price sequences that constitute subgame-perfect equilibria (Dhebar 1994, 
Fudenberg and Tirole 1998, Kornish 2001). Dhebar finds that if users expect the 
product to improve in present value terms and the monopolist cannot credibly commit 
to future prices and quality, intertemporal price discrimination may result in 
disequilibrium regardless of whether upgrade pricing is offered or not. This is due to a 
demand-side constraint on the rate of product improvement which is imposed for 
effective intertemporal discrimination. Subsequently, in a similar setting, Kornish 
complements Dhebar’s work and finds that a sub-game perfect equilibrium exists if 
quality improvement is exogenous and upgrade pricing is not offered. He speculates 
that a later product introduction may be more profitable in some ranges of the 
parameters. Both Dhebar’s and Kornish’s studies imply that the vendor may be better 
off if it can delay the introduction of the new product in some situations, but they did 
not explicitly study this phenomenon and characterize the equilibria. Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1998) incorporate market information as another input variable and analyze the 
situations where upgrade or buy-back is profitable.  
The studies on planned obsolescence concern more about the vendor’s 
incentive to introduce a new product which leads to the economic obsolescence of the 
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old product (Levinthal and Purohit 1989, Purohit 1994, Lee and Lee 1998, Fishman 
and Rob 2000). Levinthal and Purohit (1989) measure the extent to which the old 
product is obsolesced by the extent of quality improvement and the degree of 
substitutability. Lee and Lee (1998) explicitly incorporate price discrimination based 
on purchase history and valuation of quality. They call the former intra-type price 
discrimination and the latter inter-type price discrimination. They propose that price 
discrimination based on purchase history23 serves to internalize the loss from economic 
obsolescence for the vendor, thus eliminates the time inconsistency problem induced 
by new product introduction (although the time inconsistency problem induced by 
selling to the low valuation users in the subsequent period may still exist.).  They 
suggest that given high heterogeneity in users’ valuation of quality, the interaction of 
intra-type and inter-type price discrimination leads to the reallocation of surplus 
between the monopolist and the two types of users. The monopolist may only sell the 
old product rather than the new product to the low valuation users in the second period, 
if too much consumer surplus has to be given to the high valuation users. Further, if 
the profit earned from new product introduction cannot balance the innovation cost, the 
monopolist may prefer to not introduce the new product even though it is socially 
efficient to introduce it.   
Examining the findings of Dhebar (1994), Kornish (2001) and Lee and Lee 
(1998), we find that the setting of the fixed introduction timing for the new product 
(launching in the second period or not launching) constrains the monopolist’s choice of 
selling the new product: it can induce users’ self-selection of whether or not to 
purchase the new product in the second period, but not when to purchase. This is 
23 Equivalently, upgrade pricing whereby only the old users are offered a discounted price for upgrading 
to the new product. 
unrealistic considering the fact that vendors often use timing to segment the market. 
Different from Moorthy and Png’s setting (1992), here the potential market for the new 
product consists of not only new users but also the existing users who have owned the 
old product. Our second case (partly-covered installed base) bridges this gap between 
the practice and the literature in a tractable setting. Given a partly-covered installed 
base, we examine the profitability of various combinations of timing and pricing 
strategies for selling the new product in the presence of existing stock of the old 
product24. 
Our study particularly contributes to the understanding of vendor’s incentive to delay 
the introduction of new products. Fishman and Rob (2000) suggest that in an infinite-
time framework with homogeneous users, no upgrade policies, and perfectly durable 
products, a monopolist’s rate of product innovation would be too low, which can cause 
inefficient delays in new product introduction.  They show that with an upgrade policy, 
however, the vendor would not delay new product introduction. Our study extends 
their work into a heterogeneous market and derives various product introduction 
strategies that are applicable in practice. 
3.3 Basic Setting 
Consider a model with three periods, t , { }0,1,2t∈ . There exists a monopolist who is 
planning to sell two versions of a durable product, indexed by x , { },x O N∈ . Up to 
period 0, it can only sell a low-quality product, O, with quality  .Owing to R&D, a 
new technology arrives in period 1, which allows it to sell a new product, N, with 
quality , in either period 1 or 2.  For ease of presentation, we normalize  to 
Oq
Nq q> O
                                                     
Nq
24 Ruiz (2003) investigates timing and pricing strategies of new product introduction in a three-period 
model but only with homogeneous users. 
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one, and 0 .  measures the extent of quality improvement embodied in 
the new product. A smaller  represents a higher extent of quality improvement.  
Both the old (low-quality) and new (high-quality) products are of the same durability 
of  ( ) periods
1O Nq q< < = Oq
Oq
n 2n ≥ 25 .  can be considered the relative lifespan of a product 
compared to the time window of product introduction and technology improvement. 
The assumption of  is to capture the characteristics of IT-intensive products 
which have a much shorter economic lifespan than its physical lifespan (Fishman and 
Rob 2000). We further assume zero fixed and marginal costs to focus on the strategic 
choices of the vendor in response to market demand. 
n
2n ≥
On the demand side, there are two types of consumers, indexed by { },e H L∈  
and having size Hd  and , which differ in their valuation for product quality. Each 
type-H consumer values a unit of the product with quality ,
Ld
xq { },x O N∈ , and 
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 is the discounted sum (over n periods) of the periodic 
service value of product x . We normalize 1H Ld d+ = . Let H Lv v> , so that type-H 
consumers value quality more highly; H is called the high type and L the low type. 
H
L H Lv v v=  measures the heterogeneity of users in terms of valuation of quality, larger 
H
Lv  implies a higher user heterogeneity. Each consumer demands at most one unit of 
each version of the product. Within its life span, the product provides a constant stream 
of service to users: once users buy it, they enjoy a value that equals its quality in each 
                                                     
25 When n goes to infinity, the product is perfectly durable, which is the case studied in Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1998) and Kornish (2001). 
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period of service until it is retired (either because it is replaced by a newer product, or 
because it has exceeded its physical life span).  There is no second-hand market; 
hence, as soon as users buy a new product, their old products are retired and provide 
zero usage or residual values. We use δ  ( )0 δ 1≤ ≤  to denote a discount factor, which 
is common to both the vendor and users. The larger δ  is, the smaller the discount in 
future utilities or prices will be. Following Taylor (2002), we consider HH Ld v  as a 
measurement of demand elasticity. The larger HH Ld v , the less elastic is the demand. 
In period 0, some users may purchase the old product, which results in an 
installed base at the beginning of period 1. We study two cases. In the first case 
(named a fully-covered installed base), both user types have purchased the old product 
in period 0. In the second case (named a partly-covered installed base), only the high 
type has purchased the old product in period 0. The case of no purchase in period 0 is 
not in our interest, since it degenerates to a two-period model similar to the one studied 
in Moorthy and Png (1992)26. We assume that users have separate rationale between 
their purchase in period 0 and the purchase from period 1 onwards. Thus, we consider 
the installed base of the old product as an exogenous initial state of the game between 
the vendor and users.  
Periods 1 and 2 further consist of two stages. In the first stage, the vendor 
makes product and pricing decisions based on its knowledge of consumer profiles 
(how many people bought the products in the previous periods, the utilities they derive 
from the products, etc.). In the second stage, users make purchase decisions, taking 
                                                     
26 The strategy in period 0 is not in our interest too as we focus on how to launch the new product with 
an existing installed base but not the old product. Including period 0 into the game would substantially 
complicate our analysis, and it offers little additional insight. Excluding the strategy in period 0 would 
not affect our conclusions because our results are derived through a subgame perfect equilibrium path. 
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into account their valuations for the products and expectations about future products.  
There is common knowledge on demand, product quality, and technological 
improvement.  Perfect information on history of moves by the vendor and users is 
available.  We focus on rational expectations equilibria in which users form 
expectations about the product and pricing decisions of the vendor, and the vendor 
fulfills such expectations.  
In the case of a partly-covered installed base, we separate our analysis into two 
scenarios.  In the first scenario, the vendor cannot provide an upgrade option to users; 
hence, all users pay the same price for the new product. In the second scenario, the 
vendor can devise an upgrade policy, which allows users to trade in the old product for 
the new product at a discounted price. In the case of a fully-covered installed base, 
upgrade is irrelevant since both user types already own the old products. The price of 
product ,x { },x O N∈  in period t , 1, 2t =  is denoted as ; the upgrade price of the 
new product in period  is denoted as 
x
tp
t Nutp . 
3.4 Analysis 
If users do not possess any product before their purchase, they can derive the full 
utility that the product can provide in its lifespan. Equation (3.1) represents the 
willingness of a type- e consumer , { },e H L∈ , to purchase product x , { },x O N∈ , in 








−= − v q
e
      (3.1) 
Her corresponding (discounted) utility function can be represented as: 
 1e txt xtZ zδ −=        (3.2) 
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Alternatively, suppose a consumer has purchased the old product in period , Ot
{ }0,1,2Ot ∈ . Then she only values the incremental utility provided by the new product. 
Equation (3.3) represents this consumer’s willingness to purchase the new product  
in period t ,  and : 
N







t t e O eu v
δ δ q vδ δ
− −− −= −− −      (3.3) 




t t t tU δ −= Oeu        (3.4) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (3.3) is the full usage value that the 
consumer can derive from the new product if she does not possess the old product. The 
second term is the remaining usage value of the old product given that it has been 
consumed for [ ]Ot t−  periods. Equations (3.1) and (3.3) are equivalent, i.e., , 
when the old product does not exist, i.e., 
O
e e
t t Ntu z=
0Oq = .  The same applies for equations (3.2) 
and (3.4). Comparing equations (3.1) with (3.2), and (3.3) with (3.4), we find that if the 
consumer does not own any product, her willingness to purchase remains constant, i.e., 
, while she gains higher utility from an earlier purchase, 1
e
xz z= 2ex 2ex1exZ Z> . However, 
if the consumer bought the old product in period 0, her willingness to purchase 
increases over time, i.e., , because the depreciation of the old product raises 
the incremental benefit she can derive from the new product. Further, the consumer 
derives higher utility from earlier purchase of the new product, , if and only 






1 nOq δ≤ − . Otherwise, if 
1 nOq δ> − , her utility derived from the new product actually increases over time, 
. Considering the changes of equation (3.2) and (3.4) with respect to : 01 02
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∆  as the margin utility of waiting if type e  consumers 
delay their purchase of the new product for one period.  
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∆ >∆ ∆ . Proposition 1 
summarizes the above findings: 
 
Proposition 1. If a consumer has purchased the old product, because of the 
depreciation of the old product: (1) her willingness to purchase the new product 
increases over time; (2) she is better off from delaying the purchase of the new product 
if and only if 1 nOq δ> − . Otherwise, if 1 nOq δ≤ − , she would be worse off by 
delaying the purchase of the new product, but the loss is smaller compared with that of 
not possessing the old product in period 0. (3). The margin utility of delayed purchase 
of the new product increases with . Oq
 
We compare the utility that a consumer can derive from the new product ( ) in three 
situations and illustrate their time trends in Figure 3.1: (1) no purchase before the game 




Oq = Oet t NtU Z= e
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1 nOq δ> −  one period ahead of the game; (3) the consumer owns the old product with 












t tU  1 nOq δ≤ −
1 nOq δ> −
t
Figure 3.1 Consumer utility from u
 
Proposition 1 states our key disposition
The literature of new product introduction h
users possess nothing at the beginning of th
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80
Proposition 1 has important implications for product introduction strategy. One 
of the main concerns in second-degree price discrimination is the conditions under 
which a firm can maximize profit by inducing self-selection in quality, quantity or 
purchasing timing (Mussa and Rosen 1978, Spence 1980, Stokey 1979, Salant 1989). 
By Proposition 1, having possessed the old product, consumers’ marginal utility from 
delayed purchase of the new product is less negative than (or could even be positive)  
the case of not possessing the old product. Consequently, compared with the findings 
in prior research, purchasing earlier may appear less attractive to the high type 
consumer, and it becomes more difficult for the vendor to induce the high type to 
purchase ahead of the low type. Hence, we expect that the conditions favoring 
intertemporal price discrimination on selling the new product will become more 
stringent in the presence of a fully or partly covered installed base. However, our 
subsequent analysis shows that this is true in some situations but may lead to adverse 
results in the others.  
3.4.1 A Fully-Covered Installed Base 
In a fully-covered installed base, both high and low types bought the old product in 
period 0 and thus share the same purchase history. The technology to produce the new 
product is available at the beginning of period 1. The vendor has to solve an old 
problem that has been extensively studied in the literature of new product introduction 
(Salant 1989): when should it induce self-selection by selling the new product? The 
interesting point in this context is that users’ willingness to purchase the new product 
is not constant but rather increases over time, and their discounted incremental utilities 
derived from the new product is subject to changes as proposed in Proposition 1. The 
conventional setting of the absence of an installed base can be considered as an 
extreme case of a fully-covered installed base with 0Oq = .  
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The vendor’s product introduction scheme consists of its decisions on timing, 
pricing and product line strategies. Since all users possess the old product at the 
beginning of period 1, the vendor can only market the new product. The vendor may 
choose to sell the new product only in period 1, only in period 2, or in both periods. To 
price the new product, the vendor may have three options: (1) premium pricing -- a 
high price that is only affordable by the high type; (2) pooling pricing -- a low price 
that is affordable to both consumer types; (3) intertemporal price discrimination -- 
selling to the high and low types sequentially with different prices. The possible 
combinations of timing and pricing strategies are listed in Table 3.1a.  There are 
altogether four product introduction schemes denoted as A1, …, A4. Without 
commitment on its subsequent product introduction schedule, the vendor has the 
incentive to capture the remaining demand in period 2 by lowering the price. Thus the 
product introduction scheme of only selling the new product in period 1 with premium 
pricing cannot form a sub-game perfect equilibrium. Table 3.1b lists the respective 
equilibrium outcomes of strategies A1 to A4 in terms of users’ purchase sequence. For 
instance, strategy B2 is related to two sub-columns. The ‘H’ column states that the 
high type will purchase the new product in period 1; and the ‘L’ column states that the 
low type will purchase the new product in period 2. 
 
Table 3.1a Feasible Vendor’s Strategies in a Fully-Covered Installed Base 
TIMING Vendor’s strategies 





Premium pricing ⎯ A4 ⎯ 
Corner solutions 





 Intertemporal price discrimination ⎯ ⎯ A2 
 
Table 3.1b Feasible Users’ Actions in a Fully-Covered Installed Base 
Possible Outcomes 
A1 A2 A3 A4 Period
H L H L H L H L
1 N N N − − − − −
2 − − − N N N N −
 
The prices and the resulting profits for strategies A1, A3 and A4 are 
straightforward. As for strategy A2, by backward induction, we can derive the 
price in period 2:  
2 02
N Lp u= , 
which is the low type’s reservation price.  
The price of the new product in period 1 is subject to self-selection constraints:  
01 1 02 2
H N HU p U pNδ− ≥ −      (3.7) 
02 2 01 1
L N LU p U pδ− ≥ − N       (3.8) 
Equation (3.7) states that the surplus that the high type obtains from purchasing the 
new product in period 1 (the left hand side of (3.7)) should not be less than what they 
would get if they purchase it in period 2 (the right hand side of equation (3.7)). 
Similarly, equation (3.8) is to ensure that the low type is better off by purchasing in 
period 2 than in period 1. By equations (3.7) and (3.8), the maximum price that the 
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   (3.10) 
Equation (3.10) implies that with the same purchase history, the high type is more 
sensitive to the change in purchase timing than the low type. If the extent of quality 
improvement is sufficiently high ( 1 nOq δ≤ − ), both types would suffer from delayed 
purchase and the high type would lose relatively more than the low type. Hence, the 
high type will always purchase the new product earlier than the low type.  
If the extent of quality improvement is not high ( 1 nOq δ> − ), both types are 
better off from delayed purchase, and the high type will gain relatively more than the 
low type by delaying the purchase. However, the high type will not purchase the new 
product earlier or later than the low type. That is, in equilibrium, either both types buy 
simultaneously, or only the high type buy in the last period. Because of the positive 
marginal utility of waiting, to induce the high type to buy earlier than the low type, the 
vendor has to provide the high type a price lower than the price charged to the low type 
in the last period. In that case, instead of waiting until the last period, the low type will 
purchase the new product in the same period as the high type and earn a positive 
surplus. On the other hand, the high type would not buy later than the low type. This is 
because the high type still have higher reservation price than the low type, thus the 
high type can purchase the new product at any price that is affordable to the low type 
and get a positive surplus. Proposition 2 summarizes the low and high types’ purchase 
patterns in the presence of a fully-covered installed base. 
 
Proposition 2. In the presence of a fully-covered installed base of the old product, the 
high type is more sensitive to the change in purchase timing than the low type. The 
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high type will purchase the new product no later than the low type. Specifically, 
intertemporal price discrimination is feasible only if the extent of quality improvement 
is sufficiently high ( 1 nOq δ≤ − ). 
 
We summarize the price sequences and profits of strategies A1-A4 in Table 3.2. 
Comparing these profits leads to the optimal strategies as presented in Proposition 3. 
<Insert Table 3.2> 
Proposition 3. In the presence of a fully-covered installed base of the old product, the 
conditions under which each strategy dominates the others are given in Table 3.3:  
 
Table 3.3 The optimal strategies in the presence of a fully-covered installed base 
Optimal Strategy 
 The extent of quality improvement No. Timing Sales 
Low ( ) 2Oq q≥ A3 Period 2 only Both types Elastic demand 
( ) 1HH Ld v < High ( 2Oq q< ) A1 Period 1 only Both types 
Low ( ) 2Oq q≥ A4 Period 2 only High type only Intermediate case 
(1 ) HH Ld v l≤ < High ( 2Oq q< ) A2 Both periods 
First high type 
followed by 
low type 
Low ( ) 1Oq q≥ A4 Period 2 only High type only Inelastic demand 
H
H Ld v l≥  High ( 1Oq q< ) A2 Both periods 
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⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
,  if 1l > 2Oq q< . 
 
Proposition 3 shows that, when users have the same purchase history, whether the 
vendor would exercise price discrimination is determined by demand elasticity 
( HH Ld v ). If the demand is elastic ( 1
H
H Ld v < ), penetration pricing can maximize the 
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vendor’s profit by capturing the entire demand with a low price. If the demand is 
inelastic ( ), the vendor can earn more profit from the high type and at the 
same time capture the demand of the low type if possible. As for timing, instead of 
launching the new product in period 1, the vendor may choose to delay the 
introduction to period 2. When the extent of quality improvement is low, delayed 
introduction mainly serves to raise users’ willingness to purchase the new product. 
When both the extent of quality improvement and user heterogeneity are high, delayed 
introduction ensures a non-decreasing price of the new product. 
1HH Ld v ≥
Referring to Figure 3.2a, given an elastic demand (i.e., ), the vendor 
would set a low price to capture the entire demand. The rationale for delayed 
introduction is similar to the one proposed in Chapter 2 of this thesis: postponing the 
introduction of the new product allows the old product to be used for one more period, 
and hence the old product depreciates more in value; users who possess the old product 
would then be willing to pay more to upgrade to the new product in a later period.  
This allows the vendor to charge a relatively higher price for the new product and earn 
more profit.  By Proposition 1, in the region 
1HH Ld v ≤
( )2,HL OR v q q≥ , users’ payoff from 
delayed purchase is positive, and so is the vendor’s profit. 
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(a). When demand is elastic ( 1HH Ld v ≤ ) 
 
1
Period 2 only 
To both types (A3) 
Oq  2Oq q=Period 1 only 
To both types (A1) 
δ  1 0  












1 Oq q< 
Period 2 only  
To high type only (A4) 
Both periods 





First high type 
followed by low 
type (A2) 
Oq  2Oq q=  
or 
1Oq q= Period 2 only  
To high type only (A4) 
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e 3.2. Conditions of optimal strategies with a fully-covered installed base (n=3) 
δ  1 0 
Referring to Figure 3.2b, when , the vendor sets a relatively high price 
s unaffordable to the low type in order to capture the premium profit from the 
pe. More interestingly, compared to the case when demand is elastic and to 
tion 2 in my first essay, even when quality improvement is not low 
), the vendor may prefer delaying the introduction of the new product 
 this case, other than the cannibalization from the stock of the old product, it is 
nticipation of price reduction and the vendor’s incapability of commitment that 
force the vendor to delay selling the new product. On one hand, the high type is 
1HH Ld v >
q≤ 2
capable to pay a relatively high price for the new product. On the other hand, being 
aware of the vendor’s incentive of lowering the price in the subsequent period (to 
attract the low type), the high type is unwilling to pay a high price in the early period. 
The lucrative benefit from extracting the full surplus of the high type induces the 
vendor to delay the launching of the new product. By this, the vendor eliminates its 
own incentive of lowering the price in the planning horizon, thus enables the 
equilibrium with premium pricing. However, in some circumstances, the users’ 
rationale about price reduction makes both types being inefficiently served. Similar to 
Moorthy and Png (1992), the efficient purchase sequence (including purchase timing 
and bunch) is the one that can maximize consumer’s utility given her purchase history 
and the current technology level. For instance, in the presence of a fully-covered 
installed base, either the low or high type is efficiently served if: 
⎯ they purchase the new product in period 1 when 2Oq q≤ ; 
⎯ they purchase the new product in period 2 when . 2Oq q>
Consumer’s utility in the above two cases is  and , , respectively. 
Corollary 1 summarizes these findings.  
01
eU 02
eU ,e H L=
 
Corollary 1. In the presence of a fully-covered installed base of the old product, when 
the demand is elastic ( ), both types can get efficient utility. Otherwise, the low 
type always gets inefficient utility. The high type gets inefficient utility when the 
demand is very inelastic ( ) and the extent of quality improvement is moderate 
( ). 
1HH Ld v ≤
H
H Ld v l≥
1 2Oq q q< <
It is useful to compare Proposition 3 with the vendor’s optimal strategies in the 
absence of an installed base ( 0Oq = ). Substituting 0Oq =  into equations (3.1) and 
 88







− −= − , , 1, 2t = ,e H L= . The possible introduction strategies in this case 
are the same as those listed in Table 3.1a. Obviously, strategy A3 is dominated by 
strategy A1. Comparing the profits in strategies A1, A2, and A4, we characterize the 
conditions in which each strategy dominates the others in Table 3.4.  
 
Table 3.4. The optimal strategies in the absence of an installed base 
Optimal Strategy 
 Discount factor No. Timing Sales 
Elastic demand 
( ) 1HH Ld v <  A1 Period 1 only Both types 
Intermediate case 
(1 ' ) HH Ld v l< ≤  A2 Both periods 
First high type 
followed by low type 
1
2
δ >  A4 Period 2 only High type only Inelastic demand 
'  HH Ld v l> 1
2
δ ≤  A2 Both periods First high type followed by low type 
Where '
2 1
l lδδ= >− . 
 
Table 3.4 is a benchmark for examining the effects of an installed base on the 
optimality of second-degree price discrimination. Comparing the results presented in 
Tables 3.3 and Table 3.4, we find that the region where A2 is optimal shrinks with a 
fully-covered installed base. In other words, the presence of a fully-covered installed 
base makes intertemporal price discrimination less feasible to the vendor. Corollary 2 




Corollary 2. In the presence of a fully-covered installed base, the conditions under 
which intertemporal price discrimination is advantageous becomes more stringent 
compared to the case with no installed base. 
 
3.4.2 Partly-Covered Installed Base 
In this section, we consider the case in which the high type has purchased the old 
product in period 0 while the low type has not. Other than timing and pricing the new 
product, the vendor may manage the product line by selling the old product to the low 
type in period 1 or 2. By Lemma 1 below we can exclude the strategies in which the 
low type purchases nothing or purchase the old product in period 2. 
 
Lemma 1. In the presence of a partly-covered installed base, suppose there is a sub-
game perfect equilibrium in which the vendor sells the new product only to the high 
type, then it must sell the old product to the low type in period 1 and extract the full 
surplus from them. 
 
The possible combinations of timing, pricing and product line strategies are 
summarized in Table 3.5a as strategies B1, …, B8. Table 3.5b lists the respective 
equilibrium outcomes of these strategies in terms of users’ purchase sequence. For 
instance, in Table 3.5b4b, two sub-columns are listed under strategy B4. The ‘H’ 
column states that the high type will purchase the new product in period 2; the ‘L’ 
column states that the low type will purchase the new product in period 1. 
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Table 3.5a Feasible Vendor’s Strategies in a Partly-Covered Installed Base 
TIMING of new product 
Vendor’s strategies given a partly covered 





both products ⎯ B6 ⎯ Premium pricing new product only ⎯ B8 ⎯ 
both products ⎯ B5 ⎯ 
Corner 
solutions 
Penetration pricing new product only B1 B7 ⎯ 
both products ⎯ ⎯ B2 High type first 
followed by Low type new product only ⎯ ⎯ B3 









discrimination Low type first followed 
by High type new product only ⎯ ⎯ B4 
 
Table 3.5b Feasible Users’ Actions in a Partly-Covered Installed Base 
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 Period H L H L H L H L H L H L H L H L 
1 N N N O N − − N − O − O − − − − 
2 − − − N − N N − N N N − N N − N 
 
In the two-period planning horizon, the vendor may select a product replacement 
strategy of only selling the new product; alternatively, it can manage a product line 
consisting of the old and new products and sell the old product to the low type. Both 
time and product quality can be used as instruments to differentiate users with different 
valuations for quality. Further, since the low and high types also differ in their 
purchase history, the vendor may employ an upgrade policy to differentiate users who 
have purchased or not purchased the old product (Fudenberg and Tirole 1998). We 
separate our analysis into two scenarios.  In the first scenario, the vendor cannot 
provide an upgrade option to users; hence, all users must pay the same price for the 
new product. In the second scenario, the vendor can offer an upgrade policy, which 
allows users to trade in the old product for the new product at a discounted price. In 
this case, we can examine how price discrimination on purchase history interacts with 
users’ valuation of quality to impact product timing in a heterogeneous market --- a 
pending question raised by Fishman and Rob (2000). The challenges in marketing to 
users with different valuations for quality and purchase history lie in the following:  
 
(Timing and Pricing) First, selling the new product by intertemporal price 
discrimination based on valuation of quality and purchase history becomes very tricky 
even without considering the selling of the old product. This is because the relative net 
utility of the high and low types derived from the new product ( 0
H L
t NtU Z , t ) and 






∆ ∆− Nt∆ ∆ ) are shaped by the extent of 
quality improvement and user heterogeneity, and they vary with time. By Proposition 
1, the high type who owns the old product is better off waiting if and only if , 
while the low type always prefers to purchase the new product in period 1. We 
characterize consumers’ purchase patterns pertaining to a partly-covered installed base 
in Proposition 4: 
2Oq q≥
 
Proposition 4. In the presence of a partly-covered installed base, the willingness of the 
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, 1, 2t = . The low type will lose her utility from delayed 
purchase of the new product. The high type will derive a lower utility from delayed 














































−= − − , then we 
have . We further illustrate Proposition 4 by Table 3.6 which characterizes 
the regions 
1 2v v v< < 3
( ),HL OR v q  defined by HLv  and  with the relative net utility derived from 
the new product and the relative marginal utility of waiting. Table 3.6 shows the 
distinct demand structure in the presence of a partly covered installed base that have 
not been systematically analyzed in prior research -- Users’ relative utility derived 
from the new product and their relative payoff from delayed purchase vary with user 
heterogeneity and the extent of quality improvement, and further depend on the 
purchase timing. This variation in demand results in different pricing functions of the 





Lv ). Obviously, intertemporal price discrimination in selling the new product 
may be feasible in some regions of ( ),HL OR v q  but infeasible in others. An upgrade 
policy, as an exogenous force, further influences the vendor’s pricing functions given 
the same product introduction strategies.  
 
Table 3.6  Properties of the regions defined by ( HLv , ) in the presence of a 
partly-covered installed base. 
Oq




Lv v≤  1 2HLv v v< ≤  2 3HLv v v< ≤  3HLv v>  
2Oq q≥  
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∆ ∆≤ <∆ ∆
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 (Product replacement or Product line) The strategies targeting at the low type could 
be very flexible since they could be served either a single product, or a full line of both 
the old and new products. For instance, if the vendor chooses to sell the new product 
only to the high type, by Lemma 1, in equilibrium, it can only sell the old product to 
the low type in period 1, which corresponds to the outcome of strategy B6 in Table 
3.5b. If the vendor chooses to sell the new product to the low type in period 2, it has to 
determine whether or not to also sell them the old product in period 1, which 
corresponds to strategies B5 and B7 in Table 3.5b. The vendor can earn extra profits 
by selling the old product, but this extra stock of the old product dampens the price of 
the new product that the vendor can charge the low and high types. Consequently, the 
inclusion of the old product further complicates the analysis. 
3.4.2.1 With No Upgrade Policies 
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If the vendor cannot identify users who have previously bought its products, or if the 
administrative cost of trade-in is too high, it is infeasible for it to offer an upgrade 
discount to existing users.  All users must pay the same price for the new product, 
which means that 1
Nup p= N 2 and 2Nup p= N . Consider the possible strategies listed in 
Table 3.5a respectively: 
 
(1) Strategy B1 (selling the new product to both types in period 1) requires a common 
price that extracts the full surplus from the type of users with a relative lower 
reservation price for the new product. By Lemma 3, when 2
H
Lv v< , the willingness of 
the high type to purchase is lower than that of the low type ( 01 1
H L
NU Z< ), and thus we 
have 1 01
N Hp U= ; otherwise, 1 1N LNp Z= . 
(2) With strategy B2 or B3, the vendor sells the new product to the high and low types 
in period 1 and 2 respectively. For strategy B2, the vendor additionally sells the old 
product to the low type in period 1. Note that without possessing the old product at the 
beginning of the game, the low type has a higher reservation price for the new product 
compared to the case in a fully covered installed base ( 0
L L
tU Z< Nt ). Compared to the 
setting in Corollary 2 of Proposition 3, this exacerbates the difficulty of temporally 
differentiating the two types of users. Observation 1 states our findings. 
 
Observation 1. Given a partly-covered installed base of the old product, with no 
upgrade policy, selling the new product in both periods by first serving the high type in 
period 1 (strategy B2 or B3) is feasible if and only if the extent of quality improvement 
is sufficiently high, i.e., . Further, if the extent of user heterogeneity is not high 
enough, i.e., , the vendor has to compensate the low type by selling them the 






Observation 1 results from two forces that suppress the vendor’s monopoly power to 
temporally differentiate the two types of users by first serving the high type: 
One is the mutual arbitrage between the low and high types. Anticipating 
future price reductions (i.e., the time inconsistency problem as exhibited in the Coasian 
Dynamics (Coase 1972)), the high type has the incentive to delay their purchase of the 
new product to period 2. To attract the high type to purchase in period 1 (Strategy B2 
or B3), the vendor has to restrict the price ( 1
Np ) of the new product in period 1 so as to 
leave the high type the amount of positive surplus that is no less than what they might 
gain from waiting to purchase in period 2 (constraint (3A7)). However, if the user 
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heterogeneity is sufficiently low, 3
H
Lv v≤ , the relatively low price of the new product 
offered to the high type ( 1
Np ) may attract the low type to directly purchase the new 
product in period 1 rather than in period 2. In this situation, the low type would lose 




∆ ∆≤ <∆ ∆  as shown in 
the region R( , ) in Table 3.6). Hence, the reservation price of the low 
type for the new product in period 1 (
3
H
Lv v≤ 2Oq q≤
1 2 12
L L
L N LNt Nt
N
Z ZZ p U
t t
δ ∆= − = − ∆∆ ∆ ) is higher than 
the maximum price that the vendor can charge the high type in period 1 
( 01 2 12 0
H H
N N LtUp p U
t t
δ ∆= − = − tU∆∆ ∆ ). To prevent the low type from deviation (i.e., 
purchasing the new product in period 1), the only measure for the vendor is to further 
reduce the price of the old product to ensure the low type can be compensated for 
waiting to the last period (see Strategy B2 and constraint (3A5)). 
However, selling the old product in period 1 induces a mutual cannibalization 
between the old and new products. On one hand, anticipating the forthcoming of the 
new product, the low type may bypass the old product and wait for the newer one; on 
the other hand, the existing stock of old product limits users’ willingness to purchase 
the new product (see my analysis in Chapter 2). This further constrains the prices 
( ,1
Op 2
Np ) that the vendor can charge the low type for the old and new products 
(constraints (3A4) and (3A6)). 
 
 (3) Contrary to strategy B3, with strategy B4, the vendor sells the new product in two 
periods by first serving the low type. By Proposition 4 and Table 3.6, the willingness 
of the low type to purchase the new product is higher than that of the high type in both 
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 v 2periods if , and only in period 1 if 1
H
Lv ≤ 1 HLv v v< ≤ . We highlight an interesting 
property of strategy B4 in Observation 2. 
 
Observation 2. Given a partly-covered installed base of the old product, with no 
upgrade policy, selling the new product in both periods by first serving the low type in 
period 1 (strategy B4) is feasible if  and only if 2
H
Lv v≤ . Specifically, if , 
the vendor achieves perfect intertemporal price discrimination. 
1 2
H
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∆ >∆ ).  On 
the other hand, if the heterogeneity in valuation of quality is not too high (e.g. 2
H
Lv v≤  
), the high type is unwilling to accept the price in the early period because it is higher 
than the incremental utility that they can derive from the new product at that time 
( 1 1 01
N L
Np z u= > H
)
). Thus they have to wait and purchase the new product after the low 
type. Because the high type’s willingness to purchase increases over time while the 
low type’s remains unchanged (due to the partly-covered installed base), in the region 
( 1 2 ,HL OR v v v q< ≤ , the reservation price of the high type for the new product changes 
from being lower than that of the low type in period 1 to being higher than it in period 
2. The increasing need for the new product enables perfect intertemporal price 
discrimination in which the vendor extracts the full surplus of both consumer types 
from the new product. 
Observations 1 and 2 together exhibit a unique characteristic of intertemporal price 
discrimination in a market with a partly-covered installed base. Similar to Corollary 2 
of Proposition 3, the increasing need for upgrade strengthens the feasible conditions 
for intertemporal price discrimination. Different from the case of a fully-covered 
installed base, the low and high types of consumers, being heterogeneous not only in 
valuation of quality but also in purchase history, exhibit respectively a constant trend 
and an increasing trend in their willingness to purchase the new product. Thus there 
exists a certain parameterization of heterogeneity that favors another type of 
intertemporal price discrimination – one in which the low type with no purchase 





(4) Strategies B5, B6, B7 and B8 are characterized with delayed introduction of the 
new product. Both strategies B5 and B6 manage product line by selling the old product 
to the low type in period 1. Similar to strategy B2, the price sequence of strategy B5 is 
subject to the mutual cannibalization between the old and new products. Strategy B5 
results in a pooling equilibrium in which both types purchase the new product in 
period 2 with a price equal to the incremental utility of the low type derived from the 
new product ( 2
N Lp u= ). By contrast, strategy B6 leads to a separating equilibrium in 
which only the high type purchases the new product with a price equal to their 
incremental utility derived from the new product ( 2 12
N Hp u= ). In strategy B5, both types 
are left with positive surplus. In strategy B6, the surplus of both types are fully 
extracted when the low type cannot afford the price of the new product in period 2 
( ); otherwise, the low type can get a positive surplus. As for strategies B7 and 
B8, the vendor would not sell any product in period 1. Similar to strategy B1, B7 
(selling the new product to both types in period 2) requires a common price that 
extracts the full surplus from the type of user that has a relatively lower reservation 
price for the new product in period 2. Strategy B8 sells only the new product to the low 






Lv v≤ . 
The price sequences and profits for strategies B1-B8 are listed in Table 3.7. Comparing 
their profits leads to proposition 5. 
<Insert Table 3.7> 
Proposition 5. With a partly-covered installed base of the old product, and with no 
upgrade policy, for each region defined by ( ),HL OR v q , the optimal strategies given the 
different demand elasticities are presented below in Table 3.8. Specifically, regardless 
of user heterogeneity, strategy B2 (B8) is more profitable than strategy B3 (B5) when 
the size of the low type is large. 
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d in the H
H Ld v
(Delayed product introduction) Delayed introduction of the new product is not 
optimal in the region with moderate heterogeneity, ( )1 2 ,HL OR v v v q< ≤ , or the region 
with relatively low heterogeneity and high quality improvement, ( )1 2,HL OR v v q q≤ < .  
It can be optimal either in the region ( )1,HL O 2R v v q q≤ ≥  or the region ( )2 ,HL OR v v q>  
but with very different reasons.  
When both user heterogeneity and the extent of quality improvement are low 
( , ), strategy B5 outperforms other strategies because the vendor can 
profit from selling the old product in period 1 and capturing the entire demand with a 
common price in period 2. When the low type is dominant (in terms of reservation 




Lv v≤ 2Oq q≥
When the extent of user heterogeneity is high ( ), strategy B6 can be 
optimal regardless of the extent of quality improvement. The profit in strategy B6 
consists of two parts: one is the sale of the new product to the high type in period 2; the 




( 2 ,HL O )1R v v q q> ≥ , strategy B6 outperforms other strategies mainly because of the 
contribution from selling the new product. The reason behind delayed introduction is 
similar to the discussion in Section 3.4.1. By postponing the introduction of the new 
product, the vendor can raise the price of the new product either because of the 




∆ ≥∆  in the 
region ( 2,HL O )R v q q≥ ), or because of relieving the high type’s concern about future 
price reductions (region ( )2 1 2,HL OR v v q q q> ≤ < ). By contrast, in the region 
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)1( 2 ,HL OR v v q q> < , strategy B6 cannot outperform strategy B2 and B3 unless the 
profits from selling the old product to the low type in period 1 is sufficiently large. To 
make delayed introduction optimal in the region ( )2 ,HL O 1R v v q q> < , the extent of 
quality improvement cannot be too high; at the same time the discount factor should be 
small enough and the size of the low type should be sufficiently large. 
Since the competitive advantage of delayed introduction (strategy B6) 
compared with the other strategies vary with the extent of quality improvement, the 
optimality of strategy B6 requires a lower demand elasticity (or to say, a relatively 
large HH Ld v ) than that of strategies B1, B2 and B3  in the region ( )2 1,HL OR v v q q> ≥ , 
whereas a relatively high demand elasticity compared to strategy B2 and B3 is 
favorable in the region ( )2 1,HL OR v v q q> < .   
Delayed introduction with selling the new product to both types and not selling 
the old product (B7) is never optimal. This is because compared to strategy B7, with 
relatively low user heterogeneity ( 2
H
Lv v≤ ), strategy B4 gives more profit from the low 
type’s early purchase of the new product; with relatively high user heterogeneity 




(Perfect intertemporal price discrimination) Selling the new product in both periods 
by first serving the low type in period 1 (B4) dominates the other strategies regardless 
of segment sizes in the region ( )1 2 ,HL O 2R v v v q q< ≤ ≥ . By Observation 2, it also 
achieves perfect price discrimination. Similar to strategy B6, the advantage of strategy 
B4 relative to the other strategies in the region ( )2 ,HL OR v v q≤  varies with the extent of 
quality improvement. If , strategy B4 is optimal when the demand elasticity is 2Oq q≥
relatively low (cf. strategy B5 and B8); if 2Oq q< , it is optimal when the demand 
elasticity is relatively high (cf. strategy B1). 
 
Setting aside the above properties about delayed introduction and perfect intertemporal 
price discrimination, we next consider the social efficiency of the optimal strategies in 
Proposition 5. Referring to Proposition 1, the vendor’s strategy is socially efficient if it 
chooses strategy B5 in the region ( )2,HL OR v q q>  and strategy B1 in the region 
( 2,HL O )R v q q≤ . However, as shown in Table 3.8, for quite a few regions defined by 
H
Lv  and , the outcome is not efficient. Generally, due to the mutual cannibalization 
between the old and new products and the possible arbitrage between the low and high 
type users, in most of the parameter spaces, the vendor is unable to extract the full 
surplus from the users. The relocation of surplus between the vendor, the low type, and 
the high type induces the vendor to extract more surpluses by choosing inefficient 
strategies. For instance, to avoid the mutual cannibalization between the old and new 
products, it may shelve the old product when it is indeed efficient to sell it to the low 
type (e.g., strategy B4 in the region 
Oq
( )2 ,HL O 2R v v q q≤ > ); to eliminate the concern of 
future price reduction, it may delay the introduction of the new product even though it 
is efficient to launch the new product immediately in period 1 (e.g., strategy B6 in the 
region ( 2 ,HL O )2R v v q q> ≤ ). The latter confirms Fishman and Rob’s speculation about 
the dampening effect of heterogeneity on monopoly profits. 
3.4.2.2 With An Upgrade Policy 
We now consider the case when a vendor can implement an upgrade policy.  The 
provision of the upgrade option is an extra instrument for a vendor to exercise price 
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discrimination based on purchase history (Fudenberg and Tirole 1998, Lee and Lee 
1998). If the vendor can identify users who have bought the old product, it can charge 
them only the incremental utility that they receive by using the new product.  For those 
who do not own the old product, it can charge them the full utility.  
In our setting, only the high type possesses the old product at the beginning of 
period 1. The implementation of upgrade policy can improve seller’s profitability from 
two perspectives. First, the vendor can now make a credible threat to the low type that 
if they do not buy the old product in period 1, they will face a very high price of the 
new product in period 2 (cf. those who trade in the old product for the new product).  
This threat of price discrimination dissuades the low type from leapfrogging and 
encourages them to buy the old product as soon as it is available for sale. 
Consequently, the upgrade policy can eliminate the cannibalization caused by the 
forthcoming new product on the old product, which in turn improves the profitability 
of strategies that sell both products to consumers, e.g., strategies B2 and B5.  
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Second, upgrade policy encourages the high type to reveal their purchase 
history if their incremental utility from the new product is less than that of the low 
type. By this means, the vendor can easily differentiate the low and high types and 
charge the low type a higher price for the new product if they have not possessed the 
old product. We expect that the presence of the upgrade policy can improve the 
profitability of product replacement strategies if the high type’s incremental utility 
from the new product is less than that of the low type (e.g., strategies B1 and B4 in the 
region ( 2 ,HL OR v v q≤ ). Compared with Observation 1 in the case with no upgrade 
policy, Observation 3 summarizes the difference made by an upgrade policy.  
 
Observation 3. Given a partly-covered installed base, with an upgrade policy: (1) the 
surplus of the low type will always be fully extracted by the seller; (2) selling the new 
product to the high and low types sequentially (i.e., strategies B2 and B3) is always 
feasible.  
 
Nevertheless, upgrade policy is not omnipotent. The high type will choose to conceal 
their purchase history if their incremental utility derived from the new product is still 
larger than that of the low type. We elaborate this point in Lemma 2. 
 
Lemma 2. Given a partly-covered installed base, upgrade policy is incapable to 
segment users by their purchase history if user heterogeneity is sufficiently high so that 
0
H L




Table 3.9 lists the price sequence and profit for each strategy (B1-B8). The direct 
effect of Lemma 2 is that some strategies among B1-B8 would not be influenced by 
the presence of upgrade policy. Moreover, by Observation 2, in the region 
, strategy B4 achieves perfect intertemporal price discrimination even with 
no upgrade policy. Comparing Tables 3.7 and 3.9, Lemma 3 lists the strategies where 
the price sequences remain unchanged in the absence/presence of upgrade policy.  
1
H
Lv v v< ≤
<Insert Table 3.9> 
Lemma 3.  The price sequences of the following strategies would not be affected by 
the presence of upgrade policy: (1) Strategy B1 in the region ; (2) Strategy B3 






Lv v> 2Oq q≤ ; (3) Strategy B4 in the region  and 
; (4) Strategy B6 in the region  and . 
1 2
H
Lv v v< ≤
2Oq q> 2HLv v> 1Oq q>
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 Comparing their profits listed in Table 3.9 leads to Proposition 6.  
 
Proposition 6. With a partly-covered installed base of the old product, and with an 
upgrade policy, for each region defined by ( ),HL OR v q , the optimal strategies given the 
different demand elasticities are presented below. Specifically, regardless of the extent 
of user heterogeneity, strategy B2 (B5) is more profitable then strategy B3 (B1) when 
the segment size of the low type is large. 
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Table 3.10 Optimal Strategy with an upgrade policy in the presence of a partly-
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)1optimal in the region ( 2 ,HL OR v v q q> < . It shows that as strategy B2 becomes 
increasingly profitable, selling the old product in period 1 is never a competitive 
advantage for strategy B6. 
 
(Perfect price discrimination based on purchase history) The strategy selling the 
new product to both types in period 1 (B1) achieves perfect price discrimination in the 
region ( )2 ,HL O 2R v v q q≤ ≤  and is also socially optimal. With an upgrade policy, in this 
region, the vendor simultaneously offers a discounted upgrade price to the high type 
and a relatively high price to the low type. 
 
(Perfect intertemporal price discrimination) Selling the new product in both periods 
by first serving the low type in period 1 (B4) achieves perfect price discrimination in 
the region ( 2 ,H )L OR v v q≤ . However, the region where strategy B4 is optimal shrinks 
towards relatively high user heterogeneity and low quality improvement due to the 
increasing profitability of strategies B1 and B5. 
 
Quite a few studies in various settings advocate the benefit of the upgrade policy in 
maximizing the vendor’s profit and promoting socially efficient production (Waldman 
1997, Lee and Lee 1998, Fishman and Rob 2000). By Table 3.10, we notice that the 
strategies listed in Lemma 3 can be optimal within certain ranges of demand elasticity. 
This suggests that, in a more general setting with differing user heterogeneity (cf. the 
high heterogeneity setting in Lee and Lee (1998), or the homogeneous setting in 
Fishman and Rob (2000)), the upgrade policy may not be a necessary condition to 
maximize profit. Referring to Table 3.10, denote ( ), ,H HH L i L Od v B v q , , as the 1..8i =
range of demand elasticity in which strategy iB  is optimal given the parameterization 
( ),HL Ov q , Proposition 7 summarizes the conditions in which the upgrade policy will 
not be used. 
 
Proposition 7. With a partly-covered installed base of the old product, suppose that the 
vendor is able to offer an upgrade policy. It will not implement the upgrade policy in 
any of the following conditions: 
 (1) , , and 1 2
H
Lv v v< ≤ 2Oq q> ( )4 , ,H HH L Ld v B v qO ; 
(2) and 2
H
Lv v> ( )1, ,H HH L Ld v B v qO ; 
(3) , 3
H




−−< − ; 
(4) , , and 2
H




The first condition in Proposition 7 implies that in certain parameterizations, 
the perfect intertemporal price discrimination strategy can outperform the upgrade 
policy to maximize the vendor’s profit. The condition is defined by (i) the region of 
( 1 2 ,HL OR v v v q q< ≤ >  in which by employing strategy B4, the vendor can practice 
perfect intertemporal price discrimination without the assistance of an upgrade policy 
and (ii) the range of demand elasticity ( HH Ld v ) in which strategy B4 is optimal in the 
specific region ( 1 2 ,HL O )2R v v v q q< ≤ > . Similarly, the second, third and fourth 
conditions suggest that given some parameterizations of HLv , , and Oq
H
H Ld v , instead of 
the upgrade policy, a penetration pricing strategy (B1), an intertemporal price 
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discrimination strategy (B3), or a delayed introduction strategy (B6), can maximize 
the vendor’s profit. 
 110
)
Proposition 7 also implies that with its incentive to differentiate users, the vendor 
may not choose socially efficient strategies even if an upgrade policy is feasible. The 
inability of upgrade policy to segment users by their purchase history as proposed in 
Lemma 2 may lead to both types of users be inefficiently served, e.g., strategy B6 in 
the region ( 2,HL OR v q q≤ . Referring to Tables 3.8 and 3.7, the welfare of users 
depends on how much the vendor can profit from its production. If the vendor can 
sustain its monopoly power, e.g., in the region ( )2 ,HL O 2R v v q q≤ ≤ , via an upgrade 
policy, both types of users can get efficient quality. Otherwise, whether and which type 
can be efficiently served is determined by demand elasticity. Generally, the high type 
tends to get efficient quality when the demand is inelastic, whereas both types of users 
may be efficiently served when the demand is elastic. 
3.5 Concluding Remarks  
It is useful to highlight our results in light of the existing literature.  First, in their study 
of recurrent innovation, Fishman and Rob (2000) speculate that in the setting with 
heterogeneous users, the monopolist may slow down the pace of innovation because of 
the combined (dampening) effects of the stock of durable goods in use, and the users’ 
anticipation of future price reductions. Nevertheless, they did not characterize the 
profit-maximizing strategies with heterogeneous users. Their speculation has not been 
analytically validated due to the intractable setting.  
Our study confirms Fishman and Rob’s speculation about the dampening effect of 
user heterogeneity on monopoly profits. We find that there is a wide class of equilibria 
in which the vendor may forgo the chance of selling the new product earlier, and 
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instead delay selling the new product (even though it is costless to sell it earlier) to a 
later period  Such delayed introduction strategies can be optimal regardless of the 
extent of user heterogeneity and quality improvement. 
Second, prior research in various settings advocates the benefit of upgrade pricing 
in maximizing the vendor’s profits and promoting socially efficient productions 
(Waldman 1997, Lee and Lee 1998, Fishman and Rob 2000). However, in a more 
general setting with differing user heterogeneity (cf. the homogeneous setting in 
Fishman and Rob (2000)), we characterize the situations in which upgrade pricing may 
lose its ability to segment the market. We suggest that if the heterogeneity on valuation 
of quality is sufficiently high, instead of upgrade pricing, the vendor would maximize 
its profit via intertemporal price discrimination, delayed introduction, or penetration 
pricing, depending on market structure and the extent of technology improvement.   
Third, studies on product timing and pricing have used both quality and time as 
segmentation variables (Stokey 1979, Moorthy 1984).  In this literature, the reservation 
price of users for a new product decreases over time because of discounted future 
utility.  To optimize profit, a vendor would first sell a new product to high valuation 
users, and then inefficiently serve low valuation users by distorting product quality 
(Moorthy and Png 1992); high valuation users would always buy a new product before 
low valuation users do, and they can get the efficient quality that they want. 
However, our key disposition is that if some users have already owned the existing 
(old) version of a durable product, their willingness to purchase the newly improved 
version could indeed increase over time!  This is because the old product depreciates 
over time and this increases the need for users to upgrade to the new product.  Further, 
if a market consists of users with different purchase histories (i.e., some existing high-
valuation users who own the old product and new low-valuation users who do not), 
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their reservation prices for the new product may change with time in adverse 
directions. We show that these inconsistent trends among consumers could enable a 
perfect intertemporal price discrimination strategy with which a vendor sells the new 
product sequentially by first serving the low valuation users who have not purchased 
anything. When heterogeneity in user valuation is sufficiently high, the vendor might 
extract the full surplus from the low valuation users and leave them with little choice 
because they may face an even higher price in the subsequent period, because the 
willingness of the high valuation users to purchase the new product would increase 
over time.  On the other hand, if user heterogeneity is not too high, the high valuation 
users are unwilling to accept the price in the early period because it is higher than the 
incremental utility that they can derive from the new product at that time. Thus, they 
may want to wait and purchase the new product after the low valuation users. This 
incentive to postpone purchase may actually make them worse off, which is contrary to 
popular findings in the price discrimination literature (e.g., Moorthy 1984, Moorthy 
and Png 1992). 
Fourth, prior research assumes user heterogeneity on valuation of quality to be 
sufficiently high so as to exclude the cases where the willingness of the low valuation 
users to purchase an advanced version of the product is higher than that of the high 
valuation users who have possessed the old product (Waldman 1993, Lee and Lee 
1998). This assumption significantly simplifies the analysis, but it raises a question 
which may be common in reality: in a moderately heterogeneous market, if the high 
valuation users have purchased the old product, how should the vendor schedule the 
launching of the new product? In this study, we characterize the properties of this 
market with respect to users’ relative utility derived from the new product and their 
relative payoff from delayed purchase. We suggest that if the extent of quality 
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improvement is high, an upgrade policy can help the vendor extract the full surplus 
from both types of users and at the same time provide socially optimal outcome. 
Otherwise, depending on the demand elasticity, the vendor may delay the launch of the 
new product or first sell to the low valuation users.  
Our findings provide useful guidelines for product managers who often have to 
consider the installed base of their existing products when selling new products. 
Instead of transforming their business models to manipulate product durability (as 
suggested by Bulow 1986 and Waldman 1996b), they may adopt flexible timing and 
pricing strategies to cope with the existing installed base. Our setting is particularly 
applicable to IT products, especially those that depend heavily on components 
developed by external vendors. Sellers of these products often cannot control when 
new technologies are invented and when old products would become obsolete. Hence, 
for them, product innovation and introduction are two separate decisions – they might 
not be able to endogenize the extent of product innovation, but they could always 
control the timing and pricing of new products. Because IT vendors often face a huge 
installed base of existing customers using their previous products, they need to 
exercise extreme care when launching and pricing a new product that incorporates 
advanced technologies.  With suboptimal strategies, they may greatly suffer from the 
combined dampening effects of the stock of durable goods in users’ hand, and the 
users’ anticipation of future price reductions. However, via proper timing, pricing and 
product line strategies, the seller could even practise perfect price discrimination by 
exploiting the existing users’ increasing need to upgrade to the new product.  
The immediate direction for further work is to extend our research in a competitive 
market. Further, it would also be interesting to consider settings where the demand is 
uncertain, or where there is asymmetric information. 
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Table 3.2 Prices and profits with a fully-covered installed base 








O Lp q v
δ δ
δ δ






A L Lq v
δ δπ δ δ
−⎛ ⎞− −= −⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
  
A2 ( )1 nOq δ< −
( )21 1 1 11 1
n n
N n
O L O Hp q v q v
δ δδ δδ δ







O Lp q v
δ δ
δ δ
−⎛ ⎞− −= −⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
 
( )2 22 1 1 1 111 1 1 1
n n n n
n
A O L O H H O L Lq v q v d q v d
δ δ δ δπ δ δ δδ δ δ δ









O Lp q v
δ δ
δ δ






A O Lq v
δ δπ δ δ δ









O Hp q v
δ δ
δ δ






A O H Hq v d
δ δπ δ δ δ
−⎛ ⎞− −= −⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
  
 
Table 3.7 Prices and profits in a partly-covered installed base with no upgrade policy 
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Table 3.9 Prices and profits in a partly-covered installed base with an upgrade policy 
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Appendix 3A-2 
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose in equilibrium the vendor wants to sell the new product 
only to the high type, it must sell it in period 2. Otherwise, the vendor can always 
capture the remaining demand by selling the new product with any positive price in 
period 2. In such an equilibrium, the low type would purchase the old product in period 
1 because the price of the old product will not decrease and the price of the new 
product in period 2 will only be affordable to the high type. [] 
 
Proof of Proposition 4. In a partly-covered installed base, the utilities that the high and 
low types derive from purchasing the new product in period , t 1, 2t = , are represented 
as 0
H
tU  and 
L
NtZ  respectively. By equations (3.2), (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6), we have: 
(i). 0
H L
tU Z> Nt  if and only if 11 1
n
H






−> ⎡ ⎤− − −⎣ ⎦
; otherwise 0
H L
t NU Z≤ t . 




∆ ∆< ≤∆ ∆ . 




















∆ ∆≤ <∆ ∆ . [] 
 
Proof of Observation 1.  Referring to Table 4b, with strategy B3, the vendor adopts 
product replacement strategy by only selling the new product in periods 1 and 2. The 
vendor will extract the full surplus from the low type in period 2 by charging the price 
2 1
N L




self-selection constraints, such that both types would not deviate from the assigned 
purchase sequences: 
01 1 02 2
H N HU p U pNδ− ≥ −      (3A1) 
2 2 1 1
L N L
N N
NZ p Z pδ− ≥ −      (3A2) 
Substituting (3A1) and (3A2) with 2 1
N L
Op z=  results in the constraint for the price of 




L N LNt t
O O
Z UZ p Z
t t
∆− ≤ ≤ −∆ ∆
∆     (3A3) 




∆ ∆≤ <∆ ∆ . Referring to Table 3.6, only the 
region ( 3 ,HL O )2R v v q q> ≤  can satisfy this constraint. The maximum price that the 






∆= − ∆ . 
As for strategy B2, similarly, we get 2 12
N Lp u= . In equilibrium, both types of users will 
follow the purchase sequences as outlined in Table 3.5b if they are unable to benefit 
from the other alternative choices: 
1 12 1 2 1 1
L L O N L
O
O
OZ U p p Z pδ+ − − ≥ −     (3A4) 
 1 12 1 2 1 1
L L O N L
O
N
NZ U p p Z pδ+ − − ≥ −     (3A5) 
1 12 1 2 2 2
L L O N L
O
N
NZ U p p Z pδ δ+ − − ≥ −     (3A6) 
 01 1 02 2
H N HU p U pNδ− ≥ −      (3A7) 
Substituting 2 12
N Lp u=  into (3A7) gives the maximum price that the vendor can charge 
the high type in period 1:  




 which is lower than the high type’s incremental utility derived from the new product 
( 01
HU ), and equals the discounted price charged to the low type in period 2 ( 12
LU ) plus 




∆− ∆ ). Thus, 1
Np  is 




∆ ≤∆ , which corresponds to the region ( )2,HL OR v q q≤ in 
Table 3.6. Similarly, substituting 2 12
N Lp u=  into (3A4)-(3A6) , 
 If , ; otherwise 3
H
Lv v≤ 1 12 02 01 1O L H H LOp U U U Z Z= − + + − 1LN 1L1 12 2O L LN Op U Z Z= − + . [] 
 
Proof of Observation 2.  For strategy B4, the price of the new product in period 2 is 
2 02
N Hp u= . The price ( 1Np ) in period 1 is subject to self-selection constraints such that 
neither type is willing to deviate from the assigned purchase path:  
1 1 2 2
L N L
N N
NZ p Z pδ− ≥ −      (3A8) 
02 2 01 1
H N HU p U pδ− ≥ − N      (3A9) 
Meanwhile, 1
Np is also subject to a participation constraint so that the low type’s 
surplus from purchasing in period 1 is nonnegative:  
1 1 0
L N
NZ p− ≥        (3A10) 
Substituting 2 02
N Hp u=  into (3A6)-(3A8)  gives the constraint for the price of the new 
product in period 1: 
01 1 02 1min ,
L
H N H LNt
N
ZU p U Z
t
⎧ ⎫∆≤ ≤ −⎨ ⎬∆⎩ ⎭
    (3A11) 




if , 1 2
H
Lv v v< ≤ 1 1N LNp Z= ; otherwise 1 02
L
N H NtZp U
t
∆= − ∆ .  
According to the above analysis, in the region ( )1 2 ,HL OR v v v q< ≤ , the vendor can 
extract the full utility of the low and high types. The following proof shows that the 
low type, being aware of their zero surplus from purchasing in period 1, is unwilling to 
deviate. 
Given , suppose there are a small group of low type who delay their 
purchase of the new product  to period 2. Denote the size of the deviating users as 
1
H
Lv v v< ≤ 2
γ . 
Since 2 12
N Hp u=  is larger than 2LNz , to capture the extra demand of the deviating users, 
the vendor has to reduce the price to be no higher than 2
L
Nz . Setting 2 2
N L
Np z= , the 
vendor’s profit in the last period is ( )24 2LA N Hz dπ γ= × +  which is less than 12H Hu d×  
when 0γ →  with  . Consequently, given an infinite small group of the low 
type who rejects the offer in period 1, the vendor would not capture the deviating users 
by lowering the price to their affordable level. Anticipating that they would not benefit 





Proof of Observation 3. By Lemma 1, the surplus of the low type will be fully 
extracted if they only purchase the old product (i.e., strategy B6).  
If the low type purchases the old and new products in periods 1 and 2 
respectively, as discussed above, the forthcoming new product will not cannibalize the 
sales of the old product with the presence of an upgrade policy. The vendor can charge 
the low type the full service value of the old product even though they anticipate the 
new product to be available in the next period (see my analysis in Chapter 2). In 




reservation price for the new product than that of the high type ( 02 12
H Lu u> ). Thus, the 
vendor can always extract the full surplus from the low type.  
As for those strategies where the low type only purchases the new product in 
period 1 or 2 (i.e., B1, B3, B4, B7, B8), if the low type has a higher reservation price 
for the new product than the high type (e.g., when the user heterogeneity is relatively 
low), as discussed above, the high type is willing to reveal their purchase history and 
obtain a discounted price for the new product. And the low type will be offered a 
higher price that equals their full utility derived from the new product. If the low type 
has a lower reservation price for the new product, of course, they will be left with zero 
surplus. 
Thus, in any of the above cases, the surplus of the low type will be fully 
extracted. 
Since the vendor can identify users who have bought the old product, it can offer a 
relatively low price for the high type and simultaneously charge a high price to the low 
type, which is infeasible in the case with no upgrade policy. Hence, different from 
Observation 1, in the region where the low type has a higher reservation price for the 
new product (e.g., ( 2 ,H )L OR v v q≤ ) or the region where the high type is better off from 
delayed purchase (e.g., ( 2,HL O )R v q q> ), the vendor can still sell the new product to 





Case A: A fully-covered installed base 
--- Both type H and type L have purchased the old product in period 1 Oq
Possible Outcomes 
A1 A2 A3 A4 Period 
H L H L H L H L
1 N N N − − − − −
2 − − − N N N N −
 
Case B: A partly-covered installed base 
--- Only type H have purchased the old product in period 1 Oq
Possible Outcomes 
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 Period 
H L H L H L H L H L H L H L H L 
1 N N N O N − − N − O − O − − − − 
2 − − − N − N N − N N N − N N − N 
3A.1 Case A: Price Sequences and Profits of Strategies A1-A4 
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The Analysis of  A1: 
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A1 is optimal if and only if: 1 nOq δ< − , 1HH Ld v < . 
 
The Analysis of A2: 
2A 1Aπ π>  if and only if ; 1 1n nO Oq qδ δ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − < − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ HH Ld v
3A2Aπ π>  if and only if 1 nOq δ< − ; 
2A 4Aπ π> if and only if 
[ ]{ } { }1 22 1 1 2 1 1 1n n H n nO H L Oq d v qδ δ δ δ δ δ δ− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − − − < − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
A2 is optimal if and only if: 1 nOq δ< − , , and either of the following:  1HH Ld v >
(1). [ ]12 1 2 1 1n nOqδ δ δ−⎡ ⎤ ⎡− − > − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ δ ⎤⎦ ; or 
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 The Analysis of A3: 
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1A3Aπ π>  if and only if 1 nOq δ> − ; 
3A 2Aπ π>  if and only if 1 nOq δ> − ; 
3A 4Aπ π>  if and only if 1HH Ld v < ; 
A3 is optimal if and only if: 1 nOq δ> − , 1HH Ld v <  
 
The Analysis of A4: 
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A4 is optimal if and only if:  
when 1 nOq δ> − , ; 1HH Ld v >
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3A.2 Case B: Price Sequences and Profits of Strategies B1-B8 
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The Analysis of B1: 
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B1 here. 
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If 1 nOq δ≥ − , the left side of the above inequality is negative; the right side is positive, 
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 According to the analysis of B6 in the subsequent section, B6 is not optimal in this 
region. 
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B1 is optimal if and only if: 
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The Analysis of B2: 
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The Analysis of B4: 
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According to the analysis of B1-B3 and B5-B6, we know that B2, B3 and B6 are not 
optimal in the region where B4 is feasible. 
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The Analysis of B6: 
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The Analysis of B8: 
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The Analysis of B3: 
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B6 is dominated by B4.  
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The Analysis of B5: 
In the region 1 nOq δ< − , B1 dominates B5. Thus, we only consider the region 
1 nOq δ≥ −  in which B2 and B3 are not optimal. 
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The Analysis of B6: 
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CHAPTER 4 
INFORMATION SECURITY: USERS PRECAUTIONS 
AND HACKER TARGETING 
4.1 Introduction 
Information security is a critical issue of both national policy and business operations 
(Whitman 2003).  For instance, in May 2004, Sven Jaschan created the Sasser worm to 
exploit a vulnerability in the Windows 2000 and XP operating systems.  The Sasser 
worm and its variants caused hundreds of thousands of PCs to crash (BBC News 2005). 
Referring to Figure 4.1, in the second half of 2005, Symantec (2006) observed 
10,992 new Win32 viruses and worms, and blocked 8.242 million phishing messages 
















Figure 4.1 Security attacks 
Information security depends on user efforts – to fix vulnerabilities, install and 
update software to detect neutralize viruses and other malicious software, install and 
configure firewalls, take care with file-sharing programs and email attachments, etc.  
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Security is a critical issue only because of the activities of (unethical) hackers.28   
Industry has systematically tracked hacker behavior: “Attackers continuously look for 
easy targets, those that will provide them with the maximum return on the time they 
invest in writing malicious code” (Symantec 2005, page 55).  Clearly, hacker activity 
depends on user behavior.   
While there has been some research into the incentives of end-users 
(Kunreuther and Heal 2003; August and Tunca 2005), and the motivations of hackers 
(eg, Jordan and Taylor 1998; Van Beveren 2000), there has been little scholarly 
attention to the strategic interaction between end-users and hackers. 
 In this study, we analyze the strategic interactions among end-users and 
between end-users and hackers.  We address several questions in particular.  First, it is 
well known that information security poses grave potential consequences.  Yet, end-
users seem quite slow to take precautions (Boss 2005) – to the point that they must be 
exhorted and goaded by government and vendors (US-CERT 2006).   What explains 
this inertia? 
 Second, given the strategic interactions, how does information security vary 
with changes in the user cost of precaution and the rate of enforcement against 
hackers?   This question is not trivial.  For instance, a reduction in the user cost of 
precaution would directly lead users to increase precautions.  However, that would 
make them less attractive targets, and so induce hackers to reduce their targeting, and 
hence, indirectly lead users to reduce precautions.  Accordingly, the net effect depends 
on the balance between direct and indirect effects. 
28 We will focus on unethical hackers, and, for brevity, simply refer to them as “hackers”. 
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Third, information security can be and are addressed from two angles – 
facilitating end-user precautions, and enforcement against hackers.  Both policies are 
costly.  Owing to the strategic interaction, facilitation of user precautions will affect 
hacker behavior, and enforcement against hackers will affect user behavior.  From the 
standpoint of social welfare, what is the right balance between the two classes of 
policy? 
4.2 Prior Literature 
Information security is a major concern for governments and businesses worldwide 
(Whitman 2003).  Generally, it involves four groups of persons – users, hackers, 
software vendors, and security specialists such as CERT/CC.   Further, it is now 
recognized to be as much as an issue of economic incentives as a technological 
problem (Anderson 2001). 
Most economic analysis has focused on the policies of software vendors, 
CERT/CC and other security specialists to disclose security flaws and provide the 
appropriate patches (see, for instance, Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu, and Raghunathan 2004; 
Choi, Fershtman, and Gandal 2004; Nizovtsev and Thursby 2005; Arora, Caulkins, and 
Telang 2005; Jaisingh and Li 2005).  Other analyses have considered users’ incentives 
to share information (Gal-Or and Ghose 2005) and implementation of detection 
systems (Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan 2005). 
August and Tunca (2005) consider the behavior of users, and specifically, their 
incentive to patch security flaws.  In a finding that is reminiscent of the public-health 
literature on infectious diseases, they show that mandatory patching is not optimal 
(Brito et. al. 1991; Philipson 2001).  With commercial software, the optimal policy is a 
subsidy on patching when security risk and patching cost are high, and no policy 
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otherwise.  However, with open-source software, the optimal policy is a subsidy on 
patching when both security risk and patching costs are low, and a tax on software 
usage otherwise. 
August and Tunca (2005) assume that users consider the risk of attack when 
deciding whether to fix their software.   This assumption is consistent with empirical 
analyses of crime and victim precautions.  For instance, in a study of migration from 
urban areas, Cullen and Levitt (1999) found that each additional reported crime was 
associated with a decline in urban population by about one person.  In particular, the 
migration of highly educated households and those with children was relatively more 
sensitive to crime. 
However, in the specific context of software security, the risk of attack did not 
have a significant effect on experimental subjects’ intention to take precautions (Boss 
2005).  Further, in a recent survey of residential Internet users, 78% of respondents felt 
“somewhat safe”, “not very safe”, or “not at all safe” from online threats, but only 67% 
protected themselves with a firewall (National Cyber Security Alliance, 2005).  
Apparently, users are still slow to expend effort in information security.  The question 
is why? 
 Kunreuther and Heal (2003) study a positive network externality among users 
in taking precautions against attack.  Specifically, they assumed that each user makes 
an all-or-nothing choice between taking precautions or not taking precautions, and that, 
the expected loss to any user decreases with others’ precautions.  They show that, for a 
wide range of cost and risk parameters, there are two equilibria – either all users invest 
in precautions or no one does.   Kunreuther and Heal (2003), however, did not analyze 
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why the expected loss to any user decreased with others’ precautions, and specifically, 
the role of hackers.29
Previous research into hacker behavior has focused on their motivation.  
External factors encourage hackers – the perception that hacking is seldom punished 
and peer approval from other hackers (Van Beveren 2000).  However, greed, power, 
and revenge are superseding curiosity and other benign motivations (Jordan and Taylor 
1998).  Symantec (2005) also observed that the motivation of hackers has shifted 
towards making money.  This trend portends greater losses as hackers aim “to create 
more malicious code and that will become stealthier and more selective” (Symantec 
2005, page 9). 
The work closest to ours is by Choi, Fershtman, and Gandal (2005), who 
analyze the interaction of a software vendor, users, and hackers.  There are two types 
of user – the high type gets more benefit from the software and incurs a loss from 
attack while the low type receives gets less benefit and incurs no loss from attack.  
Choi et al. focus on the vendor’s investment in software quality: While the vendor’s 
profit-maximizing investment depends on the impact on the marginal user, the socially 
optimal investment depends on the effect on the average user. 
By contrast with the previous research, we focus on the strategic interaction 
among end-users and between users and hackers in a setting with a continuum of user 
types.  Our analysis shows how users’ effort in fixing depends on hackers’ targeting 
and vice versa. Accordingly, we can show how changes in policy toward hackers will 
affect user behavior, and, also how policy changes toward users will influence hacker 
behavior. 
29 See also Varian (2004). 
4.3 Basic Setting 
Consider the market for some service, which is provided by a monopoly at a uniform 
price p . (We assume a simple market structure, in order to focus on the interaction 
between end-users and hackers.)  We use the term “service” generically to encompass 
software and systems as well. 
End-users derive benefit, v , from use of the service.  The vendor would set 
price such that v , else there would be no demand.  End-users differ in naivete, n , 
which is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function,  between 
[0, 1], with 0 representing the least naïve (most sophisticated) user and 1 representing 
the most naïve user.  All users are risk-neutral. 
p>
)(nΦ
A user suffers an attack with probability χα )( f , where )( fα is a probability 
that depends on the user’s effort, , in precautions such as installing patches and 
scanning suspicious emails, and where 
f
χ  is a probability that measures the 







ααα .    (4.1) 
If the user suffers an attack, she will not derive any benefit, and in addition, will suffer 
some harm, h .30  The user’s cost of precautions is ncf .  Each potential user decides 
whether to buy and, if so, chooses precautions to maximize her expected net benefit.   
                                                     
30  This set-up is similar to that in the literature on enforcement against copyright piracy (see, for 
instance, Chen and Png (2003)). 
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There are Z  identical hackers Zi ,...,1= , each of whom chooses targeting .  
The total targeting, 
ik
ZkkK ++= ...1 , determines the effectiveness probability 







χχχχ .   (4.2) 
Each hacker derives enjoyment, e  from an attack on a user, provided that he is not 
discovered.   With enforcement probability, η , the authorities discover the hacker and 
then impose a penalty with monetary value, , and prevent his enjoyment.  Further, the 
cost of targeting is , which is convex in k .  
s
)(kcK
The hacker chooses targeting to maximize his expected net benefit. This 
modeling assumption is consistent with Symantec’s (2005, page 55) observation that 
hackers direct efforts against targets that provide the maximum return. 








Figure 4.2 Sequence of events 
 
4.4 User-Hacker Equilibrium 
Consider the end-user with type (naivete), n .  If she buys the item, her expected net 




















ncfphfvfKnB −−−−= χαχα )(])(1[)|( .  (4.3) 
Maximizing with respect to ,  f
nc
df





χ= − +    (4.4) 
which defines the net-benefit maximizing precaution, , as a function of the user 
type.  By inspection of (4.4), we have
)(nf
31
Observation 1.  User precaution, , is continuous and decreasing in naivete, , and 




K , such that, if 0=K , then 0)( =n
=
0)( ≥nB )(nB
f , and there exists  
such that .  
0)( >∞ nf
)()(lim nfnfK ∞∞→
We next characterize the demand for the service.  By (4.3), every user for 
whom  will buy the item.  It is relatively straightforward to prove that  is 
decreasing in .  Accordingly, we have n
Observation 2.  Either all users buy or there exists a marginal user, , defined by  nˆ
0)ˆ(ˆ))ˆ((][)ˆ( =−−+−= ncfnpnfhvvnB χα ,  (4.5) 
and such that only users with nn ˆ≤  buy.  
The demand for the item arises from the users with nn ˆ≤ , hence the quantity 
demanded (equal to the vendor’s sales) is  




                                                     
31  We prove all results in the Appendix 4A. 
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The following result shows how the demand for service depends on hackers’ 
targeting and the vendor’s price.   
Observation 3.  The marginal user type, , is continuous and decreasing in the user 




K .  In addition, 1ˆlim 0 =→ nK  and 0ˆˆlim nnK =∞→ , where . 0ˆ0 1n≤ ≤
Having analyzed user behavior (choices of whether to buy the item and, if so, 
precaution) as a function of hackers’ targeting, we now consider the hackers’ targeting 
















By (4.2) and since  is convex, the function  is concave in .   Maximizing 
with respect to , the first-order condition is 











)())((]1[ αχη .    (4.8) 
Since hackers are identical, they all choose the same targeting, as characterized by 
(4.8). 
Observation 4.  Hacker targeting, , is continuous and decreasing in the enforcement 
rate, 
ik
η .  Further, hacker targeting, k , is continuous and increasing in the marginal 
user type, , and, if , then 
i
nˆ 0ˆ =n 0)ˆ( =nki , and there exists some 0~ >
~
f 0> 0=f ki
k  such that if 
, then .   In addition, hacker targeting, , is continuous and decreasing 
in user precaution, , and there exists some k  such that if , then k
1ˆ =n knki )ˆ( = ik
0 0= , 





As hackers are identical, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium, in which 
, say.  For the analysis to be meaningful, we must show that there exists a non-
trivial equilibrium.  To prove existence, it is useful to consider the rate at which end-
users are subject to security attack, conditional on hacker effectiveness, 
kki =







ndKnfKA α .    (4.9) 
Accordingly, the function )()( KKA χ is the rate at which users actually suffer security 
attack, i.e, the effective vulnerability of users.   
Lemma 1 proves the existence of equilibrium by considering the relation 
between and targeting, k . The effective vulnerability is a continuous, decreasing 
function of hacker targeting, and similarly, hacker targeting is a continuous, increasing 
function of the effective vulnerability of users.  Figure 4.3 illustrates the result. 
)(KA
* *
Lemma 1.  There exists a non-trivial equilibrium between end-users and hackers, , 
 and . 
*k
ˆ( )n k )|ˆ( knf
A′ 







Figure 4.3  User-hacker equilibrium 
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Our first substantive result focuses on the strategic interaction among end-users.  
Proposition 1 shows that, given hacker behavior, users’ precautions are strategic 
substitutes (Bulow et al. 1985). 
Proposition 1.  Given hacker behavior, user precautions are strategic substitutes:  The 
higher the precautions of others, the lower the precaution of any particular individual. 
By contrast with our Proposition 1, Kunreuther and Heal (2003) suggest that 
user efforts in security are strategic complements, and that the equilibrium outcome is 
of an all-or-nothing nature – either all users or none take precautions.  By contrast, our 
analysis implies that user efforts are strategic substitutes, hence the equilibrium 
outcome could involve an intermediate level of precaution. 
Empirical evidence appears to lend stronger support to our analysis than that of 
Kunreuther and Heal (2003). Table 4.1 reports data from an annual survey of U.S. 
residential computer users.  It suggests that users take an intermediate level of 
precautions, rather than follow an all-or-nothing approach. 
 
    Table 4.1  User security measures 
Security measure 2004 2005 
Equipped with anti-virus software 85% 83% 
Equipped with properly configured firewall  28% 56% 
With active or open file sharing program  23% 11% 
Source: National Cyber Security Alliance, 2004 and 2005. 
 
Proposition 1 implies that a free-rider problem exists in user security.  If other 
users raise their precautions, they will reduce the expected harm to any particular user, 
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and she will rationally respond by reducing her precaution.   The analysis of August 
and Tunca (2005) also points to a similar free-rider problem in user security.  This 
free-rider problem is reminiscent of that arising from concealed precautions, such as 
Lojack, by potential crime victims (Koo and Png 1994; Ayres and Levitt 1998).32   
4.5 Empirical Implications 
Responding to public concern, software vendors have invested heavily to facilitate user 
precautions. For instance, in August 2004, Microsoft released Service Pack 2, to 
enhance user security.  Service Pack 2 enabled automatic update of Microsoft security 
patches and included a firewall.  Other vendors followed Microsoft to provide 
automatic updating of patches.  How would automatic updating affect overall 
vulnerability?  
In the preceding sections, we considered only the direct effects of changes in 
vendor strategy and government policy, and ignored the indirect (feedback) effects 
through the actions of the other side of the market.  We now consider the effects of 
changes in vendor strategy and government policy on the equilibrium between users 
and hackers.  Accordingly, this analysis encompasses both direct and indirect effects. 
Our analysis points to some unintended effects: specifically, actions to reduce 
user cost of precautions such as automatic updating of patches need not enhance 
overall information security.  As reported in Proposition 2 below, actions to reduce 
user cost of precautions would enhance overall security (as measured by effective user 
32 Lojack is a concealed device that allows police to track a stolen vehicle.  Ayres and Levitt (1998) 
measured a significant positive externality from Lojack installation: an owner who installed Lojack 
significantly reduced the likelihood of theft of other vehicles. 
vulnerability) if the cost of precaution is sufficiently high, but reduce overall security 
if the cost of precaution is sufficiently low.  
Next, consider an increase in the rate of enforcement against hackers, η . This 
directly leads hackers to reduce their targeting. However, there is also an indirect 
effect: users would respond to the reduced hacking by reducing their precautions, and 
the demand for the item would increase.  As reported in Proposition 2 below, the net 
impact on security (as measured by the effective user vulnerability), which balances 
the direct and indirect effects, is ambiguous.   
Similarly, an increase in the price, p, would have direct and indirect effects on 
the demand for the service.  The price increase would directly reduce n , i.e., cause 
some users to stop buying the item.  However, the price increase would also have an 
indirect (consequential) effect through hackers’ response to user choices.  With fewer 
users of the item, hackers would reduce targeting, which reduces the probability of 
attack and therefore raises users’ expected net benefit. Thus, the indirect effect from 
hackers tends to offset the direct effect of the price increase.  Accordingly, the demand 
for the item is less elastic than it would appear from studying the direct effect alone. 
ˆ
Proposition 2.  Effective user vulnerability, Aχ , is decreasing in the price of the 
service, p ; increasing in the user cost of precaution, c , if it is sufficiently high, but 
decreasing if it is sufficiently low; and ambiguous in the rate of enforcement against 
hackers and the hackers’ targeting cost. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the net effect on users’ precautions, hackers’ targeting 
and demand for the service with regard to changes in the price, p , enforcement rate, η , 
hacking cost, , and the user cost of precaution, .   Kc c
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Price,  p decreasing decreasing decreasing decreasing decreasing 
0/ ≥∂∂ cA  decreasing increasing decreasing increasing increasing Cost of 
precauti
on, c  0/ <∂∂ cA  decreasing decreasing decreasing decreasing decreasing 
Enforcement rate, η  decreasing decreasing increasing increasing ambiguous 
Targeting cost,  Kc decreasing decreasing increasing increasing ambiguous 
 
4.6 Welfare 
Information security can be and is addressed from two angles – facilitating end-user 
precautions, and enforcement against hackers.  How much should society spend on 
these policies?   
 In general, welfare could possibly include the net benefits of users, the vendor, 
and hackers.  However, following Trumbull (1990), we exclude hackers’ benefits and 
costs from the measure of welfare.  Accordingly, social welfare is 
[ ]





( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
   ( ) ( ) ( )
n n n
n n
W v d n v h f n K d n ncf n d n
v d n v h K A K ncf n d n
α χ
χ
= Φ − + Φ − Φ




Consider enforcement against hackers.  Differentiating (4.10) with respect 




ˆ ˆ( ) ( )( )
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ      ( ) ( ) .
n
dW dn d n dA d K dKv v h K
d d dn d dK d
dn d n df nncf n c n d n
d dn d
χχη η η η
η η
A⎧ ⎫Φ= − + +⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫Φ− + Φ⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∫
.  (4.11) 
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Substituting from (4.4), (4.5) and (4.8), this simplifies to 
[ ]ˆ ˆ( ) ( )dW dn d n d K dKp v h A
d d dn dK d
χ
η η η
Φ= − + .   (4.12) 
By Table 4.2, 0/ˆ >ηdnd  and /dK d 0η < , hence, 0/ >ηddW , i.e, social welfare 
unambiguously increases with enforcement.   
Society should invest in enforcement up to the level that the marginal increase 
in welfare from additional enforcement, ηd/
c
dW , just balances the marginal cost of 
enforcement.  By (4.12), the marginal increase in welfare from additional enforcement 
and hence the optimal enforcement rate is increasing in the benefit, v, harm, h, and 
price, p. 
Next, consider the facilitation of end user precautions.  Substituting from (4.9) 
in (4.10) and then differentiating with respect to , we obtain 
[ ] ( )
ˆ
0
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )( )
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ      ( ) ( ) ( ) .
n
dW dn d n dA d K dKv v h K A
dc dc dn dc dK dc
dn d n df nncf n n f n c d n
dc dn dc
χχΦ K⎧ ⎫= − + +⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫Φ ⎡ ⎤− + + Φ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭∫
.  (4.13) 
Further, substituting from (4.4), (4.5) and (4.8), this simplifies to 
ˆ
0
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )
ndW dn d n d K dKp v h A nf n d
dc dc dn dK dc
χΦ= − + − ∫ nΦ
0
.  (4.14) 
By Table 4.2, , hence the first term on the right-hand side of (4.14) is 
negative.  Also, the third term on the right-hand side of (4.14) is unambiguously 
negative.  With regard to the second term, by Table 4.2, the sign of  
depends on the sign of .  Accordingly, the effect of changes in the user 
cost of precaution on welfare is a priori ambiguous.  






It might seem surprising that the conditional vulnerability could be decreasing 
in the user cost of precaution, <∂∂ cA .  An increase in the cost of precaution would 
lead all users to reduce precautions, thus increasing the conditional vulnerability.  
However, it would also cause the marginal user to drop out of the market, hence 
reducing the conditional vulnerability.  The net effect on the conditional vulnerability 
depends on the balance of these two effects.   
If , then, by Table 4.2, 0/ <∂∂ cA 0/ <dcdK , and if  is sufficiently 
negative, then, by (4.14), dW , i.e., welfare is increasing with the user cost of 
precaution.  We consider this to be a theoretical curiosity, and not realistic.  





 and hence that 
. 
Suppose that the investment in facilitating user precautions is I.  Then, society 
should invest in facilitation up to the level that the marginal increase in welfare from 
additional facilitation equals the marginal cost of investment, i.e., 
1 0dW dW dc
dI dc dI
= − = .       (4.15) 
By (4.14), the marginal increase in welfare from additional precaution and hence the 
optimal level of facilitation is increasing in the benefit, v, harm, h, and price, p. 
 Realistically, the government may have a limited budget, and may not be able 
to fully optimize enforcement and facilitation.  In such circumstances, it is important to 
understand how best to allocate a fixed amount of resources.  For instance, if the 
government has an additional dollar to spend, should it spend that money on 




Proposition 3.  Policy should focus on facilitating user precautions rather enforcement 
against hackers if users’ benefit relative to the cost of precaution, [ , and 





]1[ η− ,      (4.16) 
are sufficiently high.   
Proposition 3 is quite intuitive.  The higher is end-users’ benefit relative to the 
cost of precaution, the greater would be the users’ incentive to take precautions, and 
hence the more effective would be any policy to facilitate precaution.  Further, the 
higher is hackers’ expected enjoyment relative to targeting cost, the greater would be 
hackers’ incentive to attack, and hence the less effective would be enforcement against 
hackers.  Accordingly, under these conditions, it makes sense to focus policy on 
facilitating end user precaution. 
According to Proposition 3, intuitively, if users’ benefit relative to the cost of 
precaution and hackers’ expected enjoyment relative to targeting cost are low, then it 
may be optimal to focus on enforcement against hackers.   
4.7 Limitations and Future Research  
We have developed a fairly general model of the strategic interaction among end-users 
in taking security precautions and also the interaction between users and hackers.  The 
analysis has provided empirical implications as well as recommendations for public 
policy.  While we considered a setting of information security, the analysis is fairly 
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general and would apply to any situation in which potential victims take precautions 
against attack by others.33  
The key direction for future research is to test the various empirical implications.  
There are two major challenges to empirical research.  One is to identify changes in the 
security environment (user cost of precaution, enforcement rate, and penalties).  The 
other challenge is to acquire sufficient data on user behavior.   The best source of 
information on user behavior that we know of is the AOL/NCSA Online Safety Study.  
However, that has been conducted only twice and only on an annual basis – in 2004 
and 2005, which limits the available time series of data on user behavior. 
There are several obvious directions for further analytical research. First, while 
we assumed that the enforcement rate was exogenous, it may realistically vary with 
hacker’s targeting.  So, it would be useful to explore the policy implications if the 
enforcement rate increases with hacker’s targeting. 
Second, we considered a setting with just one product.  Realistically, users 
might have a choice of service.  Then, the product with a larger user base would attract 
more hacking.  As mentioned above, Mozilla Firefox has been recommended over 
Internet Explorer, in part because its smaller user base has attracted less hacking 
(cio.com 2005).  In this context, any increase in demand would attract more targeting 
by hackers and hence diminish users’ expected net benefit.  Accordingly, there would 
be a negative network effect in demand.  Another direction for future research is to 
consider the implications of such negative network effects on public policy. 
33 See, for instance, Koo and Png (1994) and Kunreuther and Heal (2003). 
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Third, as mentioned above, there is an important interaction between software 
piracy and hacker targeting.   Piracy increases the user base and hence attracts hacking.  
This context presents challenging issues for vendors and policy-makers.   For instance, 
should vendors facilitate precautions by users of pirated software?  On the one hand, 
this would raise the benefit to users of pirated software and so, cannibalize the 
legitimate demand.  On the other hand, this would discourage hackers and so benefit 
legitimate users.  Accordingly, a third direction for further analysis is to consider the 
implications of piracy with hacking for vendor strategy and public policy.34
34 One approach would be to suppose that users vary on two dimensions – benefit from use and cost of 
precautions.  Users of pirated items would be subject to enforcement and loss of enjoyment of use (Chen 
and Png 2003).  In equilibrium, users would divide into three segments – those with relatively higher 
benefit and lower cost of precautions would buy the legitimate item, those with relatively lower benefit 
and lower cost of precautions would pirate, while those with relatively lower benefit and higher cost of 
precautions would not use the item. 
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Appendix 4A 
Proof of Observation 1.  Differentiating (4.4) with respect to c,  
[ ] 2 2d fv h ndf c
αχ ∂− + =∂ ,  









∂ =∂ − +
< .      (4A1) 
Differentiating (4.4) with respect to n ,  
 [ ] 2 2d fv h cdf dn
αχ ∂− + = , 
and hence, by (4.1), 





∂ = − <∂ +
.      (4A2) 
Differentiating (4.4) with respect to χ ,  
[ ] [ ] 2 2 0d dv h v hdf df
α αχ χ
∂− + − + =∂
f , 
and hence, by (4.1), 
2
2





∂ = − >∂ .       (4A3) 
By (4.2), 0/ >dKdχ , hence 0/ >∂∂ Kf .  If 0=K , then 0)( =Kχ , hence by (4.4), 
, .  Further, if 0)0|( ==Knf [0,1]n∀ ∈ ∞→K , 1)( →Kχ , hence, by (4.4), 
. [ ]  )()(lim nfnfK ∞∞→ =
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Proof of Observation 2.  We first prove that  is monotone decreasing in n .   
Consider and such that n
)(nB
< .  Let user n  choose the precautions,1 ( 2 )f n
2n
, 













By (4.3), the precautions 1( )f n  must provide user  with the maximum expected net 












   (4A5)  
Hence, by (4A4) and (4A5), )|()( 21 KnBKnB > , which is the result.  
Since  is monotone decreasing in n , the demand of the software is 
characterized as follows. Consider the most sophisticated user, n . By (4.3), her 
cost of precaution is zero and therefore she will choose the highest precaution, i.e., 
. Under the assumption that v  and by (4.1), the most sophisticated user 
would buy since B v . Consider the most naïve user, n . If B , 




(0) 0p= − > 1 0)1( ≥
0>
=
)(nB 1<n 0)1( <B , 
the most naïve user does not buy the software, and there exists some critical level as 
claimed. [ ]  
Proof of Observation 3.  Differentiating (4.5) with respect to c , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ] d f n f n f n f n f nn nv h nf n cf n cn
df c n dc dc c n dc
αχ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂− + + − − − + =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
ˆ
0n∂




∂ = − <∂ ,        (4A6) 
i.e., the marginal user, , is decreasing in c. nˆ
Differentiating (4.5) with respect to p,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ˆ ˆˆ ˆ[ ] 1d f n f n f n f n f nn nv h cf n nc
df p n p p p n p
αχ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂− + + − − − + =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
ˆ
0n , 






∂ = − <∂        (4A7) 
Differentiating (4.5) with respect to K , 
( ) ( )ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ[ ] [ ] ( )d f f n d n f f nv h v h f n cf n cn
df K n K dK K K n K
α χχ α∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + + − + − − + =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
ˆ
0 , 
hence, using (4.4), 
[ ] ( )
( )
ˆ( )ˆ ( ) 0
ˆ
v h f nn d
K cf n dK
α χ+∂ = − <∂
K      (4A8) 
Further differentiating (4A8) with respect to K, 







v h f n v hn d d f f n df
K cf n dK cf dK K n K df
α χ χ α α− + + ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤= − + ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∂ − >∂ , (4A9) 
which follows from (4.1), (4.2), (4A2), (4A3), and (4A8).  By (4A8) and (4A9), is 
decreasing and convex in K. 
nˆ
If , then 0→K 0)( →Kχ . Hence by (4.3), users’ expected net benefit, 
( ) ( )B n v p ncf n→ − − ( ) 0f n, which is maximized with = . Thus B , for 
all n.  Since , all users buy the software.  Accordingly, if , then .  
pvn −→)(
→K ˆ 1n→v p> 0
Now, if ∞→K , then 1)( →Kχ , hence, by (4.3), users’ expected net benefit, 
( ) [ ] ( ( )) ( )B n v v h f n p ncf nα→ − + − − .  As proved by Observation 2, the most 
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(0 | ) 0→∞ >
1=n (1) (1) 0p cf
sophisticated user would buy the software, i.e., B K . Consider the user 
with .  If her expected net benefit, [ ] ( (1))B v v h fα→ − + − − ≥
( ) 0B n >
B nˆ
( ) → ( (v v h f n
, then 
by Observation 2,  for all n. Hence all users will buy the software.  Otherwise, 
if , then there exists some  such that  0)1( < 0
0ˆB n 0ˆ[ ] ))α− + 0ˆp n− − 0ˆ( ) 0cf n = ,     
which completes the proof. 






ndKnfKA α .      (4A10) 
Since 0d dfα < , then 0A f∂ ∂ < . Further ˆ 0n∂Α ∂ > .  Substituting (4A10) in (4.8), 
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χ χη η η
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂− + − =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
, 














∂ =∂ − −
< .     (4A11) 
 Similarly, differentiating (4.8) with respect to n , ˆ
[ ] 22 2 2ˆ1 ( )ˆ ˆi iKi i i
k kd cA d de A n
n dk dk n dk n
χ χη ⎡ ⎤
ˆ
∂ ∂∂− + =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ∂
, 
which simplifies to 
[ ]















∂Α−∂ ∂=∂ − − Α
> .     (4A12) 
When ˆ 0n = , no one buys the software, it doesn’t pay for the hackers to attack 
the software, hence K .  When 0= ˆ 1n = , all users buy the software. Since the hacker’s 
expected net benefit, (4.7), is concave in , there exists  that satisfies the first 
order condition, (4.8), and maximizes the expected net benefit. 
ik 0k >
Similarly, we can show that 
[ ]














∂Α−∂ ∂=∂ − − Α
< ,     (4A13) 
and that there exists some  such that if 0 0k > 0f = , then 0kki = , and there exists 
some  such that if , then 0k∞ > f →∞ ∞= kki . 
Proof of Lemma 1.  By Observations 1 and 3 respectively,  is increasing in f K  and 
 is decreasing in nˆ K .  Accordingly, is monotonically decreasing in )(KA K , 
regardless of the user distribution ( )nΦ .  Further, if 0=K 0, then by (4.2), =χ , 
hence all users would choose 0)( =nf pvKn −=)|( and, by (4.3), get .  By 
assumption, 
B
0> 0K =− pv 0, hence, if all ik = , then , and 1ˆ =n , and so, . 0>A
With regard to hacker targeting, by Observation 4,  is monotonically 
increasing in 
ik
A .  Further, if 0=A 0ˆ =n ( ( )) 0f n (because either  or α = n
0
, for all ), 
then hackers will not target the software, =ik .  
 189
Figure 4.3 depicts  and )(Aki ( )kΑ , which describe the best response functions 
of the hackers and users, respectively.  Since the functions are continuous, they have a 
non-trivial intersection, say . ),( Aki
**
Given hacker targeting , let , and further, let  
and  be the marginal user and user precautions respectively.  Then, by (4.9), 














ndKnfA α .        
Now, we claim that , and prove the claim by contradiction as follows.   AA ′=*
(i) Suppose otherwise that *AA >′ .  Then, referring to Figure 4.3, the function 
 gives the hacker’s best-response )(Aki ik ′ .  Since  is monotonically 
increasing in 
)(Aki
A , we have , and so, 







1 ............ KkkkkkkK ZiZi =++++>++′++≡′ nˆ
K  and  is increasing in (.)f K , it follows that  and 
, which implies that 
)(ˆ)(ˆ *KnKn <′
)|()|( *KnfKnf >′ *AA <′ , which contradicts the 
original assumption. 
(ii) Suppose otherwise that *AA <′ .  Then, referring to Figure 4.3,  the function 
 gives the hacker’s best-response ( )k Α k ′ .  Since ( )k Α  is monotonically 
increasing in A , we have , and so, 







1 ............ KkkkkkkK ZiZi =++++<++′++≡′ nˆ
K  and  is increasing in (.)f K , it follows that  and )(ˆ)(ˆ *KnKn >′
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)|()|( *KnfKnf <′ , which implies that *AA >′ , which contradicts the 
original assumption. 
Therefore, we must have AA ′=* .  In symmetric equilibrium, , 
.  Hence, there exists a non-trivial equilibrium comprising k ,  and 
** kki =
Zi ,...,1= * *
*
ˆ( )n k
ˆ( | )f n k . [ ] 
Proof of Proposition 1.  Expand (4.8) to distinguish between the precaution of end-












)())(()())(()())((]1[ αααχη .(4A14) 
By (4A14), an increase in precautions, , by all other users except  would reduce 




0<∆χ , which in (4.4), shifts down the left-hand side. Therefore, 
user 'n  would reduce .  [ ] ( ')f n
Proof of Proposition 2.  This follows directly from the proof of Table 4.2, by noting 
that (4A16) will hold, and hence 0/ ≥∂∂ cA c c, if  is sufficiently high, and not hold if  
is sufficiently low.   
Proof of Table 4.2 
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Figure 4A  Increase in price, p 
User  cost of precaution, c
By Observations 1 and 4, an increase in the user cost of precaution, , directly leads to 
reduced user precautions, , and software demand, n .   By (4.9), these have mixed 
effects on the users’ best-response function, .  By (4.8), the increase in the user 
cost of precaution has no direct effect on .  Accordingly, the net effect on 





k A , depends on the sign of , which is 
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.     (4A16) 
We analyze two cases below. 
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(i) 0/ ≥∂∂ cA .  Referring to Figure 4A, an increase in  would lead to a new 
equilibrium, with higher targeting, , higher conditional vulnerability, 





*AA ≤′ **)()( AKAK χχ ≤′′
ZkkK ′++′=′ ...1  and .  In sum, 
when , we must have , all i, and . 
Ziii kkkkkK ′++′++′+′= +− ...... 1*11*
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nd Z...ˆˆˆˆˆ 1 .  (4A17) 
By Observation 3, 0/ˆ <∂∂ cn  and 0/ˆ <∂∂ Kn , while from above, 
, for all i.  Hence, substituting in (4A17), we have . 0/ ≥dcdki 0/ˆ <dcnd
Regarding the precautions, from above, , hence by (4.9).  *AA ≤′
ˆ
0
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ( ( )) ( ) 0
ndA dn d n d df nf n d n
dc dc dn df dc
αα Φ= + ∫ Φ ≥ .   (4A18) 
Now, , hence, substituting in (4A18), it follows that 0/ˆ <dcnd 0/ <dcdf . 
(ii) 0/ <∂∂ cA .  Referring to Figure 4A, an increase in  would lead to a new 
equilibrium, with lower targeting, , lower conditional vulnerability, 





*AA >′ ** )()( AKAK χχ >′′
ZkkK ′++′=′ ...1  and .  In sum, 
when , we must have 
Ziii kkkkkK ′++′++′+′= +− ...... 1*11*
0/ <∂∂ cA 0/ <dcdki , all i, and . 0/ <dcdA























df Z...1 .  (4A19) 
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By Observation 1, 0/ <∂∂ cf  and 0/ >∂∂ Kf , while from above, 
, for all i.  Hence, substituting in (4A19), we have . 0/ <dcdki 0/ <dcdf




ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ( ( )) ( ) 0
ndA dn d n d df nf n d n
dc dc dn df dc
αα Φ= + ∫ Φ < .   (4A20) 
Now, , hence, substituting in (4A20), it follows that 0/ <dcdf 0/ˆ <dcnd . 
Enforcement rate, η , and hacking cost, (.)Kc  
First, consider the effect of an increase in enforcement, η .  By Observations 1 and 3, 
the increase in enforcement has no direct effect on users’ precautions or demand .  
Hence, by (4.9), the best-response function 
nˆ
( )A k  remains unchanged.  By Observation 
4, the enforcement increase directly leads hackers to reduce targeting, hence their best-
response function, , shifts to the left.  Accordingly, in the new equilibrium, 
targeting is lower, , and the conditional vulnerability is higher, .   
( )ik A
*
ik k′ > i *A A′ <
Since the increase in enforcement results in lower targeting, , hence lower 
hacker effectiveness,
ik
( )Kχ , but higher conditional vulnerability, A , the impact on the 
effective user vulnerability, Aχ , depends on the balance of the effects on hackers and 
users.  
With regard to user precautions, 
df f f dK
d K dη η η
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ .       (4A21) 
By (4.4), 0/ =∂∂ ηf , by Observation 1, /f K 0∂ ∂ > , while from above, / 0dK dη < .  
Hence, substituting in (4A21), we have 0/ <ηddf . 
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Similarly, with regard to the marginal user, i.e., software demand, 
ˆ ˆ ˆdn n n dK
d K dη η η
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ .       (4A22) 
By (4.5), 0/ˆ =∂∂ ηn , by Observation 3, ˆ /n K 0∂ ∂ < , while from above, / 0dK dη < .  
Hence, substituting in (4A22), we have 0/ˆ >ηdnd , which completes the proof. 
The effect of an increase in the hacking cost is similar.  For brevity, we omit the 
proof. 
Price, p  
By Observation 1, a price increase has no direct effect on user precautions, while, by 
Observation 3, the price increase directly reduces the demand, .  Accordingly, by 
(4.9), for , the best-response function
nˆ
0ik > ( )A k  shifts downward, while, by (4.9), for 
,  does not change with p.  By (4.8), the price increase has no direct effect 
on .   
0ik = )0(A
( )ik A
Figure 4A depicts the new equilibrium: the users’ best-response function shifts 
from  downward to*( )A K ( )A K′ , while the hackers’ best-response function remains 
unchanged.  In the new equilibrium, targeting is lower, *ik ki′> , and the conditional 
vulnerability is lower, *A A′> .  
Given that the increase in price, p , leads to lower targeting, , it would, by 
(4.2) result in lower hacker effectiveness, 
k
χ .  Thus, the effective user 
vulnerability, Aχ , decreases with price, p. 
With regard to user precautions, 
df f f dK
dp p K dp
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ .       (4A23) 
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By (4.4) 0/ =∂∂ pf , by Observation 1, /f K 0∂ ∂ > , while from above, .  
Hence, substituting in (4A23), we have 
/ 0dK dp <
0/ <dpdf . 
Regarding the marginal user, from above, *A A′> , hence, by (4.9),  
ˆ
0
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )ˆ( ( )) ( ) 0
ndA dn d n d df nf n d n
dp dp dn df dp
αα Φ= + Φ∫ < .    (4A24) 
From above, , hence substituting in (4A24), it follows that , 
which completes the proof. [ ] 
0/ <dpdf 0/ˆ <dpnd
Proof of Proposition 3. By assumption, 0A c∂ ∂ > , hence 0dK dc >  and / 0dW dc < .  
By (4.12) and (4.14), dW dc dW dη>  if and only if 
[ ]ˆ
0
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )( ) ( )
n d n dn dn d K dK dKnf n d n p v h A
dn d dc dK d dc
χ
η η
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ΦΦ > + − + + ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣∫ ⎦ ,  
(4A25) 
where  
ˆ ˆdn n dK
d K dη η
∂= ∂ ,        
 (4A26) 
ˆ ˆ ˆdn n n dK
dc c K dc
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ,        
 (4A27) 
dK K K dA
d A dη η η
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ,         
(4A28) 
dA A A dK A dK
d K d K dη η η
∂ ∂ ∂= + =∂ ∂ ∂ η .       
(4A29) 
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Substituting from (4A6) and (4A8) in (4A27),   
[ ] ( )
( )
ˆ( )ˆ ˆ ( )
ˆ
v h f ndn n d K dK
dc c cf n dK dc
α χ+= − − .    
 (4A30) 

















.      
 (4A31) 









d dAeZdkdk dkdK dk dcZ

















deZ Akk kK dkZ
d c de A
dk dk
χ
χη η η η η
−∂∂ ∂∂ = + + = =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − −
 .  
 (4A33) 







K d cde AdK dk dk
K A K Ad




∂ − −∂= =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
.    
 (4A34) 
Substituting from (4A26), (4A8) and (4A30) in (4A25),  
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[ ] ( )( )
ˆ
0
ˆ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
ˆ
n f nd n n d K d n dK dKp nf n d n v h p A
dn c dK dn cf n d dc
αχ
η
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤Φ Φ+ Φ > − + + +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦∫ .    
(4A35) 
Further substituting from (4A32) and (4A34) in (4A35), and then simplifying, we have  
 ( )






ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) [1 ]
[1 ]




d n n d c dp nf n d n e Adn c c cdk dkc K Af n
dA
A dcd n dp A eZA v h A Kdn cf n dK
χη
ηα χ
⎧ ⎫⎧ ⎫Φ + Φ⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪− −⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪ > − −⎨ ⎬⎨ ⎬ ∂ ∂Φ ⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪ −+ + ⎢ ⎥ ∂ ∂⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭⎩ ⎭
∫
.   
(4A36) 
Now,  
dA A A dK A A dK dA
dc c K dc c K dA dc








∂= ∂ ∂− ∂ ∂
.       (4A37) 
Substituting from (4.5) and (4A37) in (4A36), then multiplying both sides by [ ]1 1 η− , 
and then substituting from (4.8), and simplifying, we have 
[ ]








( ) ( )







d np v h f nv pdn d cnf n d n
cf n c c e A ddkc d n dc dc dkp





Φ⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤+− ⎧ ⎫− + Φ⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥ ⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤−⎪ ⎪⎪⎣ ⎦ + −⎨ ⎬⎨ ⎢ ⎥Φ ⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎪






A c dZ v hK A dK
A K
η χ
⎡ ⎤∂−⎢ ⎥− ∂⎣ ⎦> ∂ ∂− ∂ ∂
+ .      (4A38) 
 198
Condition (4A38) will be satisfied if the users’ benefit relative to the cost of 
precaution, [ ]v p c− , and the hackers’ expected enjoyment relative to targeting cost, 
[ ]1 Kdce
dk
η− , are sufficiently large. [] 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this chapter, I will briefly review the results of these three essays, and propose a few 
possible directions for future research. 
5.1 Delayed Product Introduction 
The study of delayed product introduction investigated a monopolistic vendor’s 
incentive to delay the introduction of its newly improved product in a stationary 
market with identical consumers. In this three-period game, the vendor can only sell a 
low-quality (old) product in the first period. In the second period, due to external 
technology improvement, the vendor is able to produce a high-quality product 
incorporating the advanced technology. The vendor has to choose whether and when to 
sell the high-quality product. We find that the vendor’s monopoly power is constrained 
by the mutual cannibalization between the successive generations of products: The 
remaining stock of the old product that has already been sold to consumers limits their 
willingness to purchase the new product. On the other hand, anticipating the 
forthcoming of the new product, consumers may bypass the current product, choosing 
instead to wait and observe prospective technology.  
To alleviate the mutual cannibalization, the vendor may delay selling the new 
product, which allows the vendor to charge consumers higher prices for both the old 
and new products. By deferring sale of the new product, the vendor extends the 
economic life span of the old product, which increases its value to consumers.  It also 
allows the old product to be used for one more period, and hence the old product 
depreciates more in value. Since consumers who possess the old product are willing to 
pay only the incremental utility that they can derive from the new product, the further 
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deterioration of the old product raises their reservation price for upgrading to the new 
product in a later period.  
With an upgrade policy, the vendor can internalize the cannibalization caused 
by the new product but not the cannibalization from the old product.  The above 
analysis explains why delayed product introduction can be advantageous even when an 
upgrade policy is possible -- an insight that prior studies of product introduction with 
assumption of infinite durability (Fishman and Rob 2000; Lee and Lee 1998; Waldman 
1996) cannot show.   
This study contributes to the literature on technology adoption by analyzing 
both the vendor’s and consumers’ economic incentives of adopting a new and better 
technology. 
This study opens up several avenues of future research.  First, we could allow 
for dynamic demands with new consumers entering the market in each period, or 
incorporate heterogeneity in taste for quality.  Second, it would be interesting to see if 
competition dilutes the incentives to delay new product introductions.  Third, we have 
assumed that the new product does not affect the quality of the old product, but this 
might not be the case for products that exhibit network externalities or require 
compatible standards (Padmanabhan et al. 1997).  Finally, it may be worthwhile to 
study the interplay of delayed introduction and preannouncement (e.g., Bayus et al. 
2001; Hendricks and Singhal 1997).  Preannouncement is commonly practiced for 
software, information technology and electronics products.  It is instructive to 
investigate if preannouncement raises consumer expectations of new products, and 
whether delay in such a context serves the same function as in this paper. 
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Despite these future extensions, it is clear that the incentives of durable goods 
sellers to deploy advanced technologies in new products must be closely monitored, or 
else consumers may simply not see the light of better products. 
5.2 Technology Timing and Pricing in the Presence of an Installed 
Base 
This study investigated a monopolistic vendor’s timing, pricing and product line 
strategies for selling a new improved product in the presence of an installed base of its 
old product. The market consists of two groups of consumers with either low or high 
valuation of product quality. In the scenario of a fully-covered installed base, both 
types already possess the old product at the beginning of the game. In the scenario of a 
partly-covered installed base, only the high type owns the old product, thus they are 
distinct from the low segment not only in valuation of quality but also in purchase 
history. By generalizing users’ utility function incorporating their valuation of quality, 
purchase history and upgrade timing, we characterized the purchase pattern of users 
who already own an existing (old) version of a durable product: (1) their willingness to 
purchase the new product increases over time; (2) their (discounted) utility derived 
from the new product is less sensitive to the upgrade timing compared to not 
possessing the old product and may even increase over time if the extent of quality 
improvement is sufficiently low; (3) with the same purchase history, the high type is 
more sensitive to the change in purchase timing than that of the low type. 
Users’ purchase pattern (as elaborated above) and the nature of the product (as 
defined by the extent of quality improvement and durability) together determine the 
vendor’s optimal strategies. We were particularly interested in the strategies 
incorporating intertemporal price discrimination, delayed product introduction or 
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upgrade pricing since they exhibit distinct features compared to the existing research in 
the absence of an installed base: 
• The presence of an installed base strengthens the conditions under which 
intertemporal price discrimination by first serving the high type is advantageous. 
However, if the market is only partly covered with the old product, a moderate 
heterogeneity in valuation of quality may favor another type of intertemporal price 
discrimination – in which the low type with no purchase history consumes the new 
product earlier. 
• Because of the combined dampening effects of the installed base and heterogeneous 
users’ anticipation of future price reduction, delaying the introduction of the newly 
improved version can be advantageous regardless of the extent of user heterogeneity 
and the extent of quality improvement between the sequential versions of products. 
This is different from the finding in a market with identical users, which suggests that 
delayed product introduction only occurs with relatively low extent of quality 
improvement (Hui and Wang 2005). Further, the competitive advantages of delayed 
product introduction vary with the parameterization of the extent of quality 
improvement and the extent of user heterogeneity. When the extent of user 
heterogeneity is relatively low, by postponing selling the new product, the vendor can 
capture the whole demand in the last period. When the extent of user heterogeneity is 
relatively high, via delayed introduction, the vendor can earn more profit from selling 
the old product to the low type with a relatively low extent of quality improvement or 
from selling the new product only to the high type with a relatively high extent of 
quality improvement.  
• Unlike prior studies which advocate the benefits of the upgrade pricing in 
maximizing the vendor’s profits and promoting socially efficient production (Waldman 
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1997, Lee and Lee 1998, Fishman and Rob 2000), this study suggested that upgrade 
policy cannot segment users by their purchase history if user heterogeneity is 
sufficiently high. In this case, the vendor would maximize its profit via intertemporal 
price discrimination, or delayed introduction, or pooling pricing, depending on the 
characteristics of market structure and technology improvement. 
 
Based on the economic theories of consumer segmentation and price discrimination, this 
study provides an effective framework to address product timing and pricing strategies 
for tackling the installed base. Interesting economic factors can be included into the 
model for further research. For instance, demand-side positive network effects can be 
incorporated into consumer utility function. With backward compatibility, users of the 
newly improved version can enjoy the positive network externality from the installed 
base of the old version; while the benefit to users of the old product decreases as users 
upgrade to the new version. It is interesting to examine the impact of the various 
combinations of timing, pricing and product line strategies in the presence of network 
effects. 
 
Another direction is to test various empirical implications. Most of the propositions 
derived in the first and second essays focus on the strategic decisions of information 
goods vendor on launching newly improved product, in particular, the effects of the 
extent of quality improvement, durability, installed base and consumer heterogeneity on 
vendor’s timing, pricing and product line strategies. The empirical research requires 
sufficient data on vendor behavior and demand structure. Vendor behavior can be 
acquired based on the time series of regional sales and the installed base of certain 
product categories; while demand structure can be captured through demographic 
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information and surveying business users. With the availability of data, the findings in 
the above two essays can be validated. 
5.3 Information security: User Precautions and Hacker Targeting 
Via a fairly general model, the study of information security analyzed the strategic 
interactions among end-users and between end-users and hackers and investigated the 
impacts of changes in the user cost of precaution and the rate of enforcement against 
hackers on information security and social welfare. First, we found that since hacker 
maximizes his expected net benefit based on the overall vulnerability of the user base 
rather than specific user precautions, there is inertia among end-users in taking 
precautions even facing grave potential consequences. Second, by encompassing both 
direct and indirect effects, we showed that reducing user cost of precautions or 
increasing enforcement against hackers need not enhance overall information security 
because of the feedback effect through the actions of the other side of the market. 
Third, our welfare analysis suggested that policy should focus on facilitating user 
precautions if the users’ benefit relative to the cost of precaution and the hackers’ 
expected enjoyment relative to targeting cost are sufficiently high.  Finally, we argue 
for appropriate international authority to make and coordinate policy across borders to 
resolve international externalities. 
Other than the future research directions mentioned in Section 4.9, potential research 
opportunity also lies in the cross-boundary study between information security and 
product introduction or information privacy. First, will the threat of hacking affect the 
vendor’s decision on launching newly improved product? If yes, what are the impacts 
on product design, timing and pricing? Next, enhancing information security has 
conflicting effects on end-users’ privacy. On the one hand, it can protect end-users’ 
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privacy from hacking; on the other hand, implementation of security safeguards as 
such often require access to end-users’ systems and end-users’ personal information. 
What is the appropriate trade-off between end-users’ privacy and information security 
measures? 
5.4 Conclusion 
According to Varian (2004), “high-technology industries are subject to the same 
market forces as every other industry……. but forces that were relatively minor in the 
industrial economy turn out to be critical in the information economy”. This thesis 
extended the research of industrial organization into information goods industry, 
specifically in the areas of new product introduction and information security. The 
three studies included in this thesis demonstrate that the theories and models developed 
in traditional industrial organization are effective approaches to study the economic 
relationships existing in the emerging business models or market activities which are 
enabled by or specific to information goods industry. Further, studying the intriguing 
relationship between information technology and market structure extends the prior 
theories of industrial organization and opens up important avenues for future research. 
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